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I. INTRODUCTION: CASE-WITHIN-A-CASE
As literary devices, a “story-within-a story” and a “play-within-aplay” have a long lineage.1 Shakespeare seems to have been particularly
fond of these devices.2 The legal analog may be seen as the “case-

* Giles Sutherland Rich Professor in Intellectual Property, University of Akron School of Law. I
would like to thank Dean Martin Belsky and Associate Dean William Jordon, University of Akron
School of Law, for the grant of release time to undertake the completion of this article. I would also
like to thank Kyle Passmore, Deputy Law Librarian, University of Akron School of Law, for her
valuable research assistance, and my research assistant, Angela Cox, J.D. 2013, University of Akron
School of Law, for her dedicated assistance in the preparation of this article. Finally, I would like to
express my gratitude to my wife, Lorys Oddi, for her rigorous, but always helpful, editorial skills in
reviewing numerous drafts of this article.
1. See, e.g., MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, DON QUIXOTE: COMPLETE AND
UNABRIDGED (Walter Starkie trans., Signet Classics, reprint ed. 2009); FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE
BROTHERS KARAMAZOV (Andrew R. MacAndrew trans., Bantam Classics 1984); THOMAS KYD,
THE SPANISH TRAGEDY (Charles T. Prouty ed., Harlan Davidson 1951).
2. See Richard L. McGuire, The Play-within-the-play in 1 Henry IV, 18 SHAKESPEARE
QUARTERLY 47, 47 (1967); see also, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A MIDSUMMER NIGHT’S
DREAM (Simon & Schuster, reprint ed. 2004); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET (Cyrus Hoy ed.,

71

10- ODDI_MACRO_NEW FOOTNOTES FINAL.DOCM

72

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

5/25/2012 1:16 PM

[6:71

within-a-case” (“trial-within-a-trial,” “suit-within-a-suit”) arising in
3
legal malpractice cases. The case-within-a-case terminology seems to
be the most commonly used and hence will be used herein.4 While it is
clear that the “case” is the malpractice case,5 it is not so clear what the
6
7
“case-within-” is, which is usually referred to as the “underlying case.”
Often, it seems to be presumed that the underlying case is limited to
W. W. Norton Co., 2d. ed. 1992); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE SHREW (Jonathan
Bate and Eric Rasmussen eds., Modern Library, reprint ed. 2010).
3. See 4 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 36:12 (2011);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. b (2000);
John H. Bauman, Damages for Legal Malpractice: An Appraisal of the Crumbling Dike and the
Threatening Flood, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1127 (1988) (discussing problems of limiting damages
according to the case-within-a-case methodology to failure to obtain a judgment rather than the
actual harm resulting from the malpractice); Lawrence W. Kessler, Alternative Liability in
Litigation Malpractice Actions: Eradicating the Law Resort of Scoundrels, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
401 (2000) (examining the development of alternative duty and proof doctrines and advocating for
the application of the various doctrines in legal malpractice actions); Joseph H. Koffler, Legal
Malpractice Damages in Trial Within a Trial–A Critical Analysis of Unique Concepts: Areas of
Unconscionability, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 40 (1989) (discussing problems of fairness in applying the
trial-within-a-trial doctrine in legal malpractice actions and making recommendations to eliminate
the fairness problems); Adam J. Myers III, Misapplication of the Attorney Malpractice Paradigm to
Litigation Services: “Suit Within a Suit” Shortcomings Compel Witness Immunity for Experts, 25
PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1997) (analyzing the application of the suit-within-a-suit doctrine in litigation
services malpractice suits); Noreen L. Slank, Suit Within a Suit: A Doctrine Michigan Courts Hate
to Love, 72 MICH. B. J. 1174 (1993) (defending the suit-within-a-suit doctrine and classifying it as
“the tort system’s most powerful predictor of the correct result in a wide variety of legal malpractice
actions.”).
4. See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 36:6.
5. Malpractice will be used herein as the generic term with the understanding that the
malpractice claim may be based on professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
contract, fraud, or other theory. See 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 8:1:
Most actions brought by clients against their attorneys are for negligence, fiduciary
breach, breach of contract or fraud. Although there are other theories, these bases of
liability are familiar, usually easier to establish and provide full relief. Debate about
whether legal malpractice is based on contract or tort, and the nature of the tort, usually
concerns application of a statute of limitations, or a statute providing a special remedy or
damage recovery. Because alternative theories often are based on the same factual
allegations as a negligence cause of action, such claims frequently are treated as
redundant and are disregarded. In several jurisdictions, however, an action for legal
malpractice, though sounding in tort, is an action in contract. (footnotes omitted)
However, negligence will be referred to herein as the default theory in that it is the most commonly
relied upon either solely or in combination of one or more of the other theories. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 48 cmt. c (2000) (theories of liability:
tort and contract), 49 (breach of fiduciary duty); see also A. Samuel Oddi, Patent Attorney
Malpractice: An Oxymoron No More, 2004 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1 (discussing the various
elements and theories of malpractice cases involving patent attorneys).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 21-35.
7. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 245 (9th ed. 2009) (“case-within-a-case rule. Torts. The
requirement that a legal-malpractice-action plaintiff show that, but for the attorney’s negligence, the
plaintiff would have won the case underlying the malpractice action.”).

10- ODDI_MACRO_NEW FOOTNOTES FINAL.DOCM

2012]

PATENT ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE

5/25/2012 1:16 PM

73

litigation, which would have involved a trial culminating in a judgment
8
being entered in favor of one of the parties. In many instances,
litigation (real or hypothetical), indeed, is the source of the plaintiff’s
injury and resulting damages as a consequence of an attorney’s
9
malpractice. For example, if an attorney should miss a statute of
limitations, thus barring the plaintiff from recovering against a party
asserting the statute, the plaintiff must prove that, but for the negligence
of its attorney, it would have prevailed against that party had the case
10
been tried and gone to judgment.
8. See, e.g., Bebo Const. Co. v. Mattox O’Brien, P.C., 990 P.2d 78, 83 (Colo. 1999) (“The
plaintiff must demonstrate that the claim underlying the malpractice action should have been
successful if the attorney had acted in accordance with his or her duties.”).
9. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 1, 7, 12A (1965) provides separate definitions
for “injury,” “harm,” “damages,” and “interest:
§ 7 Injury and Harm
(1) The word “injury” is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote the
invasion of any legally protected interest of another.
(2) The word “harm” is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote the
existence of loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person resulting from any cause.
...
12 A. Damages
The word “damages” is used throughout the Restatement of this subject to denote a sum
of money awarded to a person injured by the tort of another.
§1. Interest
The word “interest” is used throughout the Restatement of this subject to denote the
object any human desire.
Mallen & Smith, however, do not find these definitions useful, stating:
The terms “damages” and “injury” frequently are used interchangeably. There is a
difference, however, which can be important. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
defines “injury” as “the invasion of any legally protected interest of another” and
“damages” as “a sum of money awarded to a person injured by the tort of another.”
Using those definitions, damages are the monetary value of an injury. The difference in
meaning can be significant, if the issue concerns when a statute of limitations
commences to run. Often, the date of injury is earlier than the date when the damages
are ascertainable or fully developed.
The Restatement’s general tort definition of “injury” is vague for use in the context
of legal malpractice claims. A more useful and precise definition for a legal malpractice
injury is the loss of a right, remedy or interest, or the imposition of a liability. Damages
concern the measure of that injury.
1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 21.1 (footnotes omitted). The Restatement (Third) of the Law:
The Law Governing Lawyers, appears to use the terms “injury” and “damages” interchangeably.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 48 (2000) (using
“injury within the meaning of § 53,” with § 53 referring to “injury, as determined under generally
applicable principles of causation and damages.”). For convenience, the terms “injury” and
“damages” will be used interchangeably herein unless otherwise indicated.
10. See, e.g., Basset v. Sheehan, 184 P.3d 1072, 1077 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (granting
summary judgment in favor of defendant firm, where plaintiff was unable to show that it would
have prevailed against underlying defendant if the statute of limitations for the underlying claim had
not been missed).
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On the other hand, there are many situations where clients are
injured due to the malpractice of attorneys that do not involve being
11
denied a favorable judgment in litigation. An example of this in the
context of patent law would be the negligent failure of a patent attorney
to file a patent application on behalf of a client in a timely manner to
avoid a statutory bar.12 This situation obviously does not involve
litigation; nonetheless, the client has suffered the loss of a patent if it can
be established that a patent would have been granted but for the failure
of the attorney to file the application in a timely manner.13 If no patent
would have been granted (e.g., because of prior art), the plaintiff would
be unable to establish a causal connection between the attorney’s
negligence and any damage suffered.14 On the other hand, even if the
patent would have been granted, plaintiff will still have to establish in
the malpractice case that it suffered damages—perhaps in the form of
loss of infringement damages or license royalties.15
When the malpractice plaintiff has suffered injury in the form of
loss of a favorable judgment as a consequence of the malpractice of its
attorney, this type of case-within-a-case will be termed herein as the
“judgment” model.16 According to this model, the malpractice plaintiff
must prove that it would have received a more favorable judgment in the
17
underlying case (litigation) but for the malpractice of the attorney.
However, this model is only a species of the general class of injuries that
18
may be suffered by clients due to the malpractice of their attorneys.
When the malpractice plaintiff has suffered injury in other than the
form of the loss of a favorable judgment as a consequence of the
malpractice of its attorney, this type of case-within-a-case will be termed
herein as the “non-judgment” model.19 The plaintiff, of course, bears
11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. b
(2000).
12. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the invention
was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on
sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United
States[.]”). See, e.g., Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump, 504 F.3d 1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir.
2007) discussed infra text accompanying notes 82-129, where the allegation of malpractice was that
plaintiff’s patent attorneys had failed to raise the defense of a statutory bar with respect to the patent
asserted against plaintiff.
13. See, e.g., LaBelle v. McGonagle, No. 07-12097-GAO, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63117, at
*6 (D. Mass. Aug. 15, 2008).
14. Id.
15. See ASTech, LLC v. Husick, 676 F. Supp. 2d 389, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. b.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. As expressed in the Restatement (Third) of the Law: The Law Governing Lawyers:
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the burden of proving it suffered actual damages of a nature other than
20
To further
the loss of a favorable judgment in the underlying case.
illustrate these models, a more comprehensive definition of the “casewithin-” (i.e., the underlying case) may be helpful.
Indeed, “case” has a broader connotation than litigation/trial/suit.
The venerable Black’s Law Dictionary gives the following definition:
“case . . . [a] civil or criminal proceeding, action, suit, or controversy at
21
Thus, according to this definition, it would be
law or in equity.”
appropriate to consider a “controversy” as being included within the
“case-within-” (the underlying case) as well as “proceeding, action, suit”
to which “trial” could be added.
Courts, particularly those who are following the judgment model,
often refer to “case-within-a-case” as a doctrine,22 rule,23 requirement,24

A plaintiff may show that the defendant’s negligence or fiduciary breach caused
injury other than the loss of a judgment. For example, a plaintiff may contend that, in a
previous action, the plaintiff would have obtained a settlement but for the malpractice of
the lawyer who then represented the plaintiff. A plaintiff might contend that the
defendant in the previous action made a settlement offer, that the plaintiff’s then lawyer
negligently failed to inform plaintiff of the offer (see § 20(3)), and that, if informed,
plaintiff would have accepted the offer. If the plaintiff can prove this, the plaintiff can
recover the difference between what the claimant would have received under the
settlement offer and the amount, if any, the claimant in fact received through later
settlement or judgment. Similarly, in appropriate circumstances, a plaintiff who can
establish that the negligence or fiduciary breach of the plaintiff’s former lawyer deprived
the plaintiff of a substantial chance of prevailing and that, due to that misconduct, the
results of a previous trial cannot be reconstructed, may recover for the loss of that chance
in jurisdictions recognizing such a theory of recovery in professional-malpractice cases
generally.
The plaintiff in a previous civil action may recover without proving the results of a
trial if the party claims damages other than loss of a judgment. For example, a lawyer
who negligently discloses a client’s trade secret during litigation might be liable for harm
to the client’s business caused by the disclosure.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. b.
20. See ASTech, 676 F. Supp. 2d at 402.
21. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 243 (9th ed. 2009). The use of this source seems particularly
apropos in view of the Federal Circuit’s reliance on it in Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A. for the
definition of a “claim” in a malpractice complaint. 596 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
22. See, e.g., Davis, 596 F.3d at 1360-61 (citing Envtl. Network Corp. v. Goodman Weiss
Miller, LLP, 893 N.E.2d 173, 175 (Ohio 2008) and Vahila v. Hall, 674 N.E.2d 1164, 1168-69 (Ohio
1997)); see also Dan Nelson Constr., Inc. v. Nodland & Dickson, 608 N.W.2d 267, 271 (N.D.
2000).
23. See, e.g., Bauer v. Dyer, 782 So. 2d 1133, 1140 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Young v. Gum, 649
S.E.2d 469, 473 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
24. See, e.g., Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump, 504 F.3d 1262, 1269 (Fed. Cir.
2007); Adamasu v. Gifford, No. 273895, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1034, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. May
15, 2008).
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or element,25 thus giving the impression that it is mandatory that the
malpractice plaintiff prove that it would have prevailed to judgment in
the underlying case to recover in the malpractice case. Recognizing that
“case” has a broader meaning than “litigation” to include
“controversies” may help to avoid this significant limitation to the scope
of legal malpractice cases (controversies). Other courts have preferred
to categorize “case-within-a-case” as a methodology26 or analysis27
rather than as a doctrine/rule/requirement/element. There seems to be
considerable merit in this usage because the “case-within-a-case”
methodology is being used whether the malpractice plaintiff is alleging
damages for the failure to obtain a favorable judgment in the underlying
litigation (judgment model) or actual damages suffered as a result of
malpractice in representation in the underlying controversy (nonjudgment model).28
In both the judgment and non-judgment models, in the context of a
malpractice case based on negligence, the duty and breach elements
(constituting negligence) are the same for both the malpractice case and
the underlying case (controversy), where malpractice is alleged to have
occurred.29 However, in the “judgment” model, the causation and
damage elements are conflated, with the only damage recoverable by the
plaintiff being the hypothetical loss of a favorable judgment had the trial
been held in the underlying case.30 Accordingly, the only “cognizable”
damage in the “judgment” model is the loss of a favorable judgment in
31
the hypothetical underlying case-within-a-case. There is, of course, no
causal relationship between the negligent conduct of the defendant
attorney and any damage suffered by the malpractice plaintiff, if damage
25. See, e.g., Spaise v. Dodd, No. A03-1430, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 607, at *22 (Minn. Ct.
App. June 1, 2004) (requiring appellant to prove that he would have been successful in the
underlying action as an element of his claim in order to recover in his malpractice suit); Fiedler v.
Adams, 466 N.W.2d 39, 42 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1269, uses casewithin-a-case “context” (quoted infra text at note 478).
26. See, e.g., Cecala v. Newman, 532 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1140 (D. Ariz. 2007); ASTech, LLC
v. Husick, 676 F. Supp. 2d 389, 400-01 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Herrington v. Superior Court, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 658, 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
27. See, e.g., Stockbridge v. Chedraue, No. 206942, 1999 Mich. App. LEXIS 417, at *3 (Feb.
26, 1999); Apollo Enters., Inc. v. ScripNet, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 848, 870 (Tex. App. 2009) (citing Tex.
Logos, L.P. v. Brinkmeyer, 254 S.W.3d 644, 654 (Tex. App. 2008)).
28. See ASTech, 676 F. Supp. 2d at 401-02 (discussing application of the case-within-a-case
methodology in both those situations in which the underlying claim involved litigation and those in
which it did not).
29. See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 36:1.
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. b
(2000).
31. Id.
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is limited to the loss of a favorable judgment in the underlying case and
the plaintiff cannot establish that specific form of damage.
In the “non-judgment” model, the duty-breach-causation elements
are the same as in the “judgment” model;32 however, the damage
element is determined by the nature of the damage the malpractice
plaintiff pleads it has actually suffered, and such damage is not limited
to prevailing in any hypothetical underlying case that would have
33
In other words, the malpractice
resulted in a favorable judgment.
plaintiff in the “non-judgment” model is not required to prove it would
have obtained a judgment in the underlying case, but only that it suffered
actual damages causally related to defendant attorney’s negligence in the
34
underlying transaction. These damages may be based on a variety of
35
theories.
In using the “case-within-a-case” methodology, it is important to
recognize that the underlying case that precipitated the malpractice claim
is not limited to litigation that would have resulted in a favorable
judgment for the malpractice plaintiff, but also includes any controversy
where, due to the malpractice of the attorney, plaintiff has suffered
damages.36 The judgment and non-judgment models provide an
explanatory framework. The elements of a legal malpractice case
remain the same in both models, with the understanding that the damage
element may be satisfied by the loss of a favorable judgment or other
37
actual damages in the underlying case (controversy).
A.

Jurisdiction—Federal or State

Malpractice cases brought against patent attorneys have a further
complication. Malpractice cases traditionally fall within the jurisdiction

32. See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 36:1.
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. b.
34. Id.
35. See 3 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 3, Part IV (damages); see also John C.P. Goldberg,
What Clients Are Owed: Cautionary Observations on Lawyers and Loss of Chance, 52 EMORY L.J.
1201, 1212-13 (2003) (advocating against the application of the loss-of-chance doctrine in legal
malpractice cases); Kessler, supra note 3, at 516-17 (advocating for the application of the loss-ofchance doctrine in legal malpractice cases and arguing that calculating the lost settlement value of a
case is the best method by which to calculate loss of chance); Polly A. Lord, Loss of Chance in
Legal Malpractice, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1479 (1986) (discussing the loss-of-chance doctrine and
advocating for application of the doctrine in certain legal malpractice cases); Id. at 1491-94.
(advocating for the application of the loss-of- chance doctrine in legal malpractice actions that meet
certain criteria).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35.
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of state courts as state common law causes of action.38 Cases “arising
under” the federal patent statute are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
39
the federal courts. The issue then becomes whether malpractice cases
against patent attorneys should fall within the jurisdiction of state courts,
which would then be required to resolve questions of patent law, or
whether such cases should fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of
federal courts, which would then be required to resolve state questions of
malpractice law.
For better or worse, depending on one’s point of view, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has, at least so far, broadly assumed
federal subject matter jurisdiction in malpractice cases involving patent
attorneys based upon its definition of what constitutes a “substantial
question of federal patent law.”40 The result, essentially, is that federal
courts will decide state malpractice issues rather than state courts
deciding federal patent law issues, although at least two judges on the
Federal Circuit would limit the scope of the court’s jurisdiction but for
stare decisis, and there are pockets of resistance in both state and federal
courts to this perceived usurpation of historic state jurisdiction over legal
malpractice claims.41
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created by the
Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982.42 The Federal Circuit was
granted exclusive jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) over “an
appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States . . . in
any civil action arising under, or in any civil action in which a party has

38. See Minton v. Gunn (Minton I), 301 S.W.3d 702, 709 (Tex. App. 2009), overruled on
other grounds by Minton v. Gunn (Minton II), 355 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2010).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006). See infra text accompanying note 44 (quoting statute).
40. On the federal subject matter jurisdictional issue, see generally 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra
note 3, § 35:4; DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §21.02 [1] & Supp (2011 ed.); see also
Robert A. Mathews, Annotated Patent Digest § 36:19 (database updated Sept. 2011) (digesting
jurisdictional cases involving patent attorney malpractice); Michael Ena, Comment, Jurisdictional
Issues in the Adjudication of Patent Law Malpractice Cases in Light of Recent Federal Circuit
Decisions, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 219 (2008) (discussing Air
Measurement/Immunocept and their implications for patent law practitioners); Christopher G.
Wilson, Note, Embedded Federal Questions, Exclusive Jurisdiction, and Patent-Based Malpractice
Claims, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1237 (2009) (supporting state jurisdiction).
41. See Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, 2011-1012, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2011) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 267-96); see also infra text
accompanying notes 402-17, 424-53 (discussing cases challenging the jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit). As stated in Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C., 666 F. Supp. 2d 749, 752
(E.D. Mich. 2009), vacated, 631 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011), “[T]he Federal Circuit appears to
impose . . . an all-embracing test, effectively aggregating ever greater swaths of state-law claims
into its jurisdictional sweep.”
42. Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
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asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress
43
relating to patents . . . .” Under § 1338(a), federal district courts are
granted “original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any act of
Congress relating to patents. . . .”44 Prior to this grant of exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit, appeals from patent
45
decisions of district courts were to the regional court of appeals.
Among the reasons given for the creation of the Federal Circuit were to
have patent cases decided by the expertise of a specialized court and to
46
provide greater consistency in decisions relating to patents. With this
creation of exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit,
questions had to arise of the interfaces of that jurisdiction with the
regional federal circuit courts of appeal and with state courts.
This article will first provide a brief history of the jurisdictional
controversy between federal courts and between federal courts and state
courts. Then, the question will be examined of how the subject matter
jurisdictional question has been resolved with respect to patent attorney
malpractice cases to the extent it has been to date in the federal and state
courts. The manner in which the case-within-a-case doctrine or
methodology has been used in deciding the jurisdictional question will
also be investigated. In addition, the relevance of the use of the
judgment or non-judgment model to determine patent attorney
malpractice will be explored. Consideration will also be given to those
decisions that have opposed a broad imposition of federal jurisdiction
over malpractice cases involving patent attorneys. In conclusion, some
general observations will be offered concerning the jurisdictional and
substantive issues raised in patent attorney malpractice cases. A detailed
discussion of all jurisdictional issues arising in patent attorney
malpractice cases, however, will not be undertaken here as the focus of
this article is the case-within-a-case methodology in the resolution of the

43. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1295(a)(1) (Lexis 2011).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006).
45. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1989) (discussing the divergence among the regional circuits in patent
cases as a region for the creation of the Federal Circuit).
46. For the historical background of the creation of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, see JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY 1982-1990 (Marion T. Bennett ed., 1991);
Federal Circuit 25th Anniversary Edition, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 123 (2007); Richard H. Seamon, The
Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543 (2003);
Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative Response, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1003 (1991).

10- ODDI_MACRO_NEW FOOTNOTES FINAL.DOCM

80

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

5/25/2012 1:16 PM

[6:71

basic question of whether there is federal or state jurisdiction over the
47
case.
B.

Brief History of Jurisdictional Issues
1. United States Supreme Court and “Arising Under” Jurisdiction

In 1988, the Supreme Court, in Christianson v. Colt Industries
Operating Corp. (Christianson IV),48 interpreted § 1338(a) in order to
resolve a jurisdictional controversy between the Federal Circuit and the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and hence to avoid, as Justice
Brennan referred to it, “a perpetual game of jurisdictional ping pong.”49
50
Both courts denied having jurisdiction.
Christianson was a former
employee of Colt who began to sell M-16 rifle parts in competition with
51
Colt. Colt brought suit in a federal district court against Christianson
and others for patent infringement, and breach of proprietary information
52
After Colt voluntarily dismissed its
and non-disclosure agreements.
claims against Christianson, he brought antitrust actions under the
Clayton and Sherman Acts against Colt, and also included allegations
that the Colt patents were invalid for failing to satisfy the enabling and
53
best-made requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 of the Patent Act. In the
district court, Christianson prevailed on antitrust counts against Colt and
54
also had nine of Colt’s patents declared invalid.
Colt appealed to the Federal Circuit; however, the Federal Circuit
declined jurisdiction and referred the case to the Seventh Circuit.55 The
Seventh Circuit, sua sponte, raised the jurisdictional issue and
determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction; rather, the
Federal Circuit did.56 The Federal Circuit then “in the interest of
57
justice” proceeded to take the appeal and reversed the district court.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 477-82 (identifying a number of these jurisdiction
issues).
48. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. (Christianson IV), 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
49. Id. at 818-19.
50. Id. at 803.
51. Id. at 804.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 805.
54. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. (Christianson I), 613 F. Supp. 330, 331-32
(C.D. Ill. 1985).
55. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. (Christianson II), 798 F.2d 1051, 1055 (7th
Cir. 1986).
56. Id.
57. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. (Christianson III), 822 F.2d 1544, 1560 (Fed.
Cir. 1987), vacated by 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and resolved the controversy
58
by applying prior “arising under” holdings. The Court concluded:
Linguistic consistency, to which we have historically adhered,
demands that § 1338(a) jurisdiction likewise extend only to those cases
in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent
law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well59
pleaded claims.

The Court concluded that neither the antitrust claims nor the state claim
arose under patent law, so the jurisdictional issue here depended upon
“whether patent law ‘is a necessary element of one of the well pleaded
[antitrust] claims.’”60 As the antitrust claims could be resolved without
reference to patent law, the Court held that the Federal Circuit did not
61
have “arising under” jurisdiction.
Thus, there are two prongs to the appellate jurisdiction of Federal
Circuit: (1) “primary” jurisdiction where “federal patent statute creates
62
the cause of action” (e.g. patent infringement), and (2) “substantial
question” jurisdiction where “plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily
depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in
that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded
claims.”63
With respect to the interface between state jurisdiction and federal
jurisdiction, in 1986, the Supreme Court had held in Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson64 that “a complaint alleging a
violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause of action,
when Congress has determined that there should be no private, federal
cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim ‘arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,’” that would grant
federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.65

58. Christianson IV, 486 U.S. 800, 807 (1988).
59. Id. at 808-09 (emphasis added).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 812-13. The Court also concluded that in the “interests of justice” trying to resolve
a “ping pong” situation did not authorize a court to decide a case in the absence of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 818.
62. Id. at 808-09.
63. Id.
64. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
65. Id. at 817 (citation omitted).
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In Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering &
66
Manufacturing, decided in 2005, the Court resolved a conflict within
the circuits as to whether Merrell Dow required a federal cause of action
“arising under” the statute in question as a condition for exercising
federal jurisdiction.67 The Court held that it did not when the question
involved the interpretation of an Internal Revenue Code provision
relating to the notice requirement for quieting title.68 The Court stated
69
that Merrell Dow was not to the contrary; however, it did provide the
following qualification:
Because arising-under jurisdiction to hear a state-law claim always
raises the possibility of upsetting the state-federal line drawn (or at
least assumed) by Congress, the presence of a disputed federal issue
and the ostensible importance of a federal forum are never necessarily
dispositive; there must always be an assessment of any disruptive
portent in exercising federal jurisdiction. . . .
These considerations have kept us from stating a “single, precise,
all-embracing” test for jurisdiction over federal issues embedded in
state-law claims between nondiverse parties. . . . Instead, the question
is, does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue,
actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain
without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal
70
and state judicial responsibilities.

As will be seen by the following decisions of the Federal Circuit
defining its subject matter jurisdiction under § 1338(a) in patent attorney
malpractice cases, it has laid primary emphasis on Christianson VI,
liberally interpreting what constitutes a “substantial question of federal
71
patent law” within the context of the “case-within-a-case.”

66. Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005), reh’g
denied, 545 U.S. 1158 (2005).
67. Id. at 311-12.
68. Id. at 319-20.
69. Id. at 316.
70. Id. at 314.
71. However, more recently in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite (Lab.
Corp. IV), 599 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2010), the Federal Circuit appeared to be giving more deference
to Grable. See infra text accompanying note 221 (discussing this case). Moreover, in the most
recent case relating to jurisdiction in a patent malpractice case, Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans,
LLP, 2011-2012, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127, at *13, *15-17 (Fed Cir. Nov. 18, 2011), two
judges would revisit the scope of federal jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying notes 267-96
(discussing this case).
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2. Federal Circuit Jurisdiction and Case-Within-a-Case
In a series of cases prior to any case dealing with patent attorney
malpractice, the Federal Circuit held that it had jurisdiction based on a
substantial question of patent law arising in a number of contexts.72 In
Additive Controls & Measurement Systems, Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc.,73
decided in 1993, the court held that there was federal jurisdiction over a
state business disparagement claim that required proof of non74
Similarly, in Hunter
infringement of a patent to resolve the case.
75
Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., decided in 1998, the court
found federal jurisdiction over a state law claim of injurious falsehood
76
that required proof of the invalidity of a patent. In 2000, the court in
77
U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, held that there was § 1338 jurisdiction over a
78
breach of contract claim that required proof of patent infringement. In
2002, the court held in University of West Virginia v. VanVoorhies79 that
there was § 1338 jurisdiction over the issue of whether there was a
breach of duty to assign a patent required determination if the disputed
patent application was a continuation-in-part application.80
It was not, however, until 2007 that the Federal Circuit had an
opportunity to address the issue of whether it had subject matter over a
state malpractice case involving patent attorneys in two cases, decided
on the same day by the same panel.81
In Air Measurement
82
Technologies, Inc. v. Akin Gump (Air Measurement), plaintiff (AMT)
filed a malpractice claim against its former patent firms (defendants) in
a Texas state court alleging that, due to the defendants’ negligence,
plaintiff was “forced . . . to settle the prior litigation far below the fair
72. Additive Controls & Measurements Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 478-79
(Fed. Cir. 1993); Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
U.S. Valves, Inc., v. Dray, Sr., 212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Univ. of W. Va., Bd. of Trs.
v. Vanvoorhies, 278 F.3d 1288, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
73. Additive Controls, 986 F.2d 476.
74. Id. at 478.
75. Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d 1318, overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v.
Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Traffix Devices v.
Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
76. Id. at 1329.
77. U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d 1368.
78. Id. at 1372. Accord Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., 125 F.3d 288, 291 (5th Cir. 1997)
(finding § 1338 jurisdiction and transferring case to Federal Circuit court where proof of breach of
contract claim requires proof of infringement). See discussion of Fifth Circuit cases, infra text
accompanying notes 324-40.
79. Univ. of W. Va., Bd. of Trs. v. Vanvoorhies, 278 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
80. Id. at 1295.
81. See Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump, 504 F.3d 1262, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
82. Id.
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market value of the patents because the prior litigation defendants were,
inter alia, able to raise as defenses invalidity (e.g., an on sale bar) and
unenforceability (due to inequitable conduct) that would not have
existed without attorney error.”83 Indeed, six infringement cases were
settled by AMT “for a total of approximately $10 million without a
judicial determination of infringement, invalidity, or unenforceability of
AMT’s patents.”84 The defendants then removed the case to the Federal
85
District Court for the Western District of Texas. Plaintiff then moved
to have the case remanded to state court, which was denied.86
The parties then changed their jurisdictional positions, with
defendants now moving to have the case remanded to state court, which
87
The district court again refused to
was opposed by plaintiff AMT.
88
remand the case. Defendants appealed the jurisdictional issue to the
Federal Circuit, which accepted it as presenting an issue of “first
89
impression.” To resolve the question, the Federal Circuit (opinion by
Chief Judge Michel, joined by Judges Lourie and Rader) applied the
“second prong” of Christianson test to determine “whether patent law is
a necessary element of [plaintiff’s] malpractice claim.”90 The court
recited the elements of a malpractice case in Texas91 and concluded that
the case-within-a-case “requirement” applied:
Because AMT’s malpractice claim stems in part from unsuccessful
prior litigation, AMT must establish that they would have prevailed in
the prior litigation but for Akin Gump’s negligence that compromised
the litigation. This is called the “case-within-a-case” requirement of
92
the proximate cause element of malpractice.

As authority for the proposition that the “case-within-a-case
requirement” is a component of the “proximate cause” element of a
malpractice action, the court cites and quotes from a Texas appellate
court case: “Because the plaintiff must establish that the underlying suit
would have been won ‘but for’ the attorney’s breach of duty, this ‘suit
within a suit’ requirement is necessarily a component of the plaintiff’s
83. Id. at 1266 (citations omitted).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1267.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1268.
91. Id. at 1268-69 (citing Ballesteros v. Jones, 985 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Tex. App. 1998))
(emphasis added).
92. Id. (emphasis added).
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burden on cause in fact.” 93 This reliance is not further explained, but
the court goes on to conclude:
Because proof of patent infringement is necessary to show AMT
would have prevailed in the prior litigation, patent infringement is a
“necessary element” of AMT’s malpractice claim and therefore
apparently presents a substantial question of patent law conferring §
94
1338 jurisdiction.

While “proof of patent infringement is necessary to show AMT would
have prevailed in the prior litigation,” it does not follow that “patent
infringement is a ‘necessary element’ of AMT’s malpractice claim . . .
.”95 The damages being claimed by AMT in the malpractice claim are
not infringement damages, but rather “impaired settlement value” as a
96
Thus, the Federal
consequence of defendants’ alleged malpractice.
Circuit seems to adopt, without elaboration, the “judgment” model of the
case-within-a-case methodology, leading to the same requirements for a
finding of federal jurisdiction as for malpractice action where the
plaintiff must prove that it would have obtained a judgment in the
underlying case.97 This result will be further explored below.98
To buttress its jurisdictional finding the Federal Circuit reasoned:
Indeed, we would consider it illogical for the Western District of Texas
to have jurisdiction under § 1338 to hear the underlying infringement
suit and for us then to determine that the same court does not have
jurisdiction under § 1338 to hear the same substantial patent question
99
in the “case-within-a-case” context of a state malpractice claim.

Thus, the logical conclusion would seem to be that, if the underlying
case (infringement) would invoke the “first prong” of the “arising under”
jurisdiction interpretation of § 1338(a) in Christianson VI, then the
“second prong” would also be satisfied. It seems clear that if plaintiff
must prove patent infringement, there is a “significant question of patent
law,” but the fact that a district court has jurisdiction over a patent
infringement case does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a
finding of patent infringement is the only means by which the patent

93. Id. at 1269 (citing Ballesteros, 985 S.W.2d at 489) (emphasis added).
94. Id. (citing Christianson IV, 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988)) (emphasis added).
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. See id. at 1270-71.
97. See id.
98. See infra text accompanying notes 119-29.
99. Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump, 504 F.3d 1262, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(emphasis added).
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owner might have suffered damages as a consequence of patent attorney
100
negligence.
As the court considered proof of infringement as critical to the
jurisdiction issue, it also noted that, in addition to proving patent
infringement within the “‘case-within-a-case’ context,” the plaintiff
would have to show that it would have prevailed against the defenses
that the prior litigants raised.101 These defenses included allegations of a
102
The court did not consider
statutory bar and inequitable conduct.
these as “jurisdiction-defeating defenses contemplated by Christianson, .
. . for they are part of the malpractice causation element rather than the
defenses raised by [defendants] in the current litigation.”103 However, in
the context of whether these defenses had to be valid or merely
available, the court states rather cryptically: “To the extent that AMT
has to prove or overcome invalidity, invalidity may be a substantial
104
The court then states the ultimate importance
question of patent law.”
of proving infringement for jurisdictional purposes: “Regardless of the
defenses AMT would have to address, if any, AMT would certainly have
to prove patent infringement; that alone confers § 1338 jurisdiction.”105
The court does not address the question of whether the defenses
themselves would raise a substantial question of patent law justifying the
106
Certainly, the potential invalidity of a
grant of federal jurisdiction.
patent because of a statutory bar or its unenforceability because of
inequitable conduct is as critical to the patent owner as is proving
infringement.107 Indeed, the issue of infringement, of course, depends
on the validity and enforceability of the patents being asserted.108

100. See Christianson IV, 486 U.S. 800, 811-12 (1988).
101. Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1270.
102. Id. at 1266.
103. Id. at 1270.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006):
The following shall be defenses in any action involving the validity or infringement of a
patent and shall be pleaded:
(1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or unenforceability,
(2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in part II of this
title as a condition for patentability,
(3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with any
requirement of sections 112 or 251 of this title,
(4) Any other fact or act made a defense by this title.
108. Id.
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The Federal Circuit finally addressed the damage issue, but still
109
In an attempt to avoid
within the context of patent infringement.
federal jurisdiction, defendants contended that the “impaired settlement
value theory . . . is a novel theory of malpractice that does not require the
110
The court
resolution of a substantial question of patent law.”
dismisses this argument, viewing “the impaired settlement value theory
as a theory of damages not a theory of liability for malpractice.”111 It
defined “the impaired settlement value theory as calculat[ing] the
difference between the actual settlement amount and the predicted
settlement amount absent [of] malpractice.”112 But then the court goes
on without further elaboration: “In addition to computation of damages,
AMT must still prove it would have been successful in the underlying
litigation but for the alleged errors, which will require proof of patent
113
This conclusion begs the question: Why in addition
infringement.”
to the computation of damages (presumably according to the loss of
settlement value theory) must plaintiff prove infringement? It would
appear that the purpose of a settlement is to avoid the expense and
114
The settlement
uncertainty of the outcome of an infringement trial.
presumably would have occurred prior to any judgment of infringement
115
Indeed, in this case, the six infringement cases were
being reached.
settled for about $10 million without any determination of infringement
or entering of a judgment to that effect.116 What plaintiff is claiming is
that, because of the negligent handling of the litigation, it was unable to
settle the infringement case at a higher value than it would otherwise
have had defendants not been negligent.117 This determination is

109. Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1271.
110. Id. at 1270.
111. Id. at 1271.
112. Id. The court presumably accepts this theory of damages based on Texas state law.
However, Professor Dobbs observes:
[T]he fact that every case has a settlement value, even if it is very small, does not mean
that the plaintiff-client whose case would have been lost even by the best lawyering
should recover a settlement value from her malpracticing lawyer. It is convenient to
treat these examples in the discussion of remedies, but they suggest that the case with a
case puzzle probably has not been finally solved.
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 486 (2000).
113. Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1271.
114. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 312
(2006) (finding that “most patent cases settle fairly quickly . . . thereby reducing the actual cost of
patent litigation considerably.”).
115. Id.
116. Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1266.
117. Id.

10- ODDI_MACRO_NEW FOOTNOTES FINAL.DOCM

88

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

5/25/2012 1:16 PM

[6:71

independent of any finding of infringement. The value of the settlement
would, seemingly, depend on the strength of the patent, which,
118
If
according to plaintiff, was undermined by defendants’ negligence.
plaintiff must prove that the patent was infringed, this eliminates loss of
settlement value as a theory of damages.
The confusion is confirmed by the following sentence of the court:
“Thus, the impaired settlement value theory does not obviate the ‘casewithin-a-case’ element of AMT’s claim.”119 Indeed, the case-within-acase methodology is essential to plaintiff’s malpractice claim, because, if
plaintiff can prove impairment of the settlement value that would not
have occurred but for the negligence of defendants, plaintiff would have
satisfied the elements of its malpractice case—presuming that the nonjudgment model is recognized.120 Plaintiff may be able to prove that
there was a loss of settlement value even if the patents would
hypothetically have been found not to be infringed. It would seem, if
patents involved in litigation have a settlement value prior to a judgment
being entered by a court for infringement, that settlement value may be
adversely affected by negligent conduct on the part of plaintiff’s
attorneys in the infringement litigation. It does not seem justified to
presume that a patent has a settlement value only if it would have been
infringed.
The final argument raised by defendants in Air Measurement
against the grant of federal jurisdiction was that “Grable adds a new
dimension to the Christianson test based on the congressionally-

118. Id. at 1271; On settling patent infringement cases, see Kesan & Ball, supra note 114, at
243 (footnotes omitted):
There is general agreement that the costs associated with pursuing a patent lawsuit are
high. Previous authors have cited legal costs of patent litigation running from $500,000
to $3 million per suit or $500,000 per claim at issue per side. These costs create
incentives for the parties to settle their dispute rather than seek a final judgment on the
merits. Throughout the case, the parties will be receiving additional information about
the strength of their positions through the results of discovery, the court’s construction of
the patent claims at issue, rulings on motions for summary judgment, rulings on
preliminary injunctions, and the like. Economic theory suggests that when it becomes
obvious that a patent is very likely to be invalidated, it is in the best interests of the
patent holder to offer a cheap license to keep the patent rights intact, and it is in the best
interests of the defendant to accept such an offer rather than incur further significant
legal costs. Specifically, it is in the interest of the alleged infringer to accept a license if
its cost would be less than the cost of continued litigation. Only patent disputes where it
is difficult to predict who will win are likely to proceed further to a final determination
on the merits.
119. Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1271 (emphasis added).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20 and 26-34.
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approved balance between federal and state jurisdiction.”121 The
Federal Circuit rejects this argument, asserting that there is a strong
federal interest in adjudicating patent infringement issues in federal
courts as patents are issued by a federal agency and also that litigants
benefit from the expertise of federal judges in “construction and
infringement matters.”122
It is not apparent from the reasoning in Air Measurement whether
the Federal Circuit is adopting a judgment model of the case-within-acase methodology. The problem faced by plaintiff—now having
prevailed on the federal jurisdiction issue—is whether, in order to
recover any damages, it must prove infringement of its patents and
prevail over the defenses of invalidity as being statutorily barred and
unenforceability for inequitable conduct.123
If the court is adopting the judgment model, it would result in the
introduction of a case-within-a-case methodology in the underlying case
(the case-within-) to establish jurisdiction (duty-breach-causationdamages (infringement)).124 The same case-within-a-case methodology
would then be applied to the underlying case to resolve the malpractice
(duty-breach-causation–damages (infringement or “impaired settlement
125
Hence, the result is the application of the case-within-avalue”?)).
case-within-a-case “approach.”126 The consequences of this approach
would seem to result in “the tail wagging the dog,” with the resolution of
the jurisdiction issue seemingly determining the scope of the malpractice
case. For jurisdiction, the malpractice plaintiff must prove infringement
and must also prove infringement for malpractice damages to be
awarded, even though the claimed damage is diminished settlement
value, not infringement damages.127
The court conflates the
jurisdictional issue (“substantial question of patent law”) with the
128
malpractice case, while federal “arising under” jurisdiction need only
be established by a substantial question of patent law being raised,
presumably with respect to any element (duty, breach, causation,
129
damage) of the malpractice case.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1271.
Id. at 1272.
See id. at 1270-71.
See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
The word “approach” is used here for want of a better term.
Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1271.
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 251-55.

10- ODDI_MACRO_NEW FOOTNOTES FINAL.DOCM

90

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

5/25/2012 1:16 PM

[6:71

The companion case to Air Measurement, Immunocept, LLC v.
130
originated as a
Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP (Immunocept II),
malpractice case filed in the same district court in Texas, with plaintiff
alleging that the defendant firm had negligently limited the scope of a
claim in the patent prosecuted by the firm by using the “closed”
transition phrase “consisting of” rather than an “open” transition such as
131
As a consequence, a potential licensee under the patent
“comprising.”
132
The district court held, inter alia, that the
terminated negotiations.
malpractice claim was barred by the Texas statute of limitations, and
plaintiff appealed.133 The Federal Circuit (before the same panel as in
Air Measurement) raised the subject matter jurisdiction issue sua sponte,
and both sides briefed this issue, agreeing that there was federal
jurisdiction over the case.134 The Federal Circuit also agreed, affirming
135
the finding of § 1338 jurisdiction.
In finding jurisdiction, the court reasoned that, because plaintiff’s
malpractice case was based on the allegation of a claim drafting error, it
136
The court then
could not “prevail without addressing claim scope.”
easily found jurisdiction: “Because patent claim scope defines the scope
of patent protection, . . . we surely consider claim scope to be a
137
substantial question of patent law.”
Thus, determining it had jurisdiction, the court proceeded to affirm
the district court’s holding that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the Texas
138
Texas follows a discovery rule in legal
statute of limitations.
130. Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP (Immunocept II), 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed.
Cir. 2007), reh’g denied, 2006-1432, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26823 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2007).
131. Id. at 1283. See DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8:06[b][1][ii][A]-[C] (2011)
(discussing “open” and “closed” transitional terms. In particular, see id. note 47 (citation omitted):
Quoting treatise, “Some information pertaining to patent claim drafting is in order.
There are three parts to a claim: the preamble, the transition and the body. The transition
is the part with which we currently are concerned.”; Three categories or transition:
“Generally, there are three categories of transitions. . . . An open-ended transition is
recognized by use of the term ‘comprising’ or the phrase ‘which comprises.’. . . A
closed-ended transition employs either the phrase ‘consisting of’ or the phrase ‘which
consists of.’ . . . Finally, the intermediate transition, sometimes referred to as nearly
closed-ended, is identified by either the phrase ‘consisting essentially of’ or ‘which
consists essentially of.’ . . . The intermediate transition excludes ‘additional, unspecified
components that would affect the basic and novel characteristics of the product defined
in the balance of the claim.’”
132. Immunocept II, 504 F.3d at 1283.
133. Id. at 1284.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1286.
136. Id. at 1285.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1288.
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malpractice cases.139 The court quotes from a decision of the Texas
Supreme Court indicating that, under the discovery rule, the statute of
limitations begins to run when a “client discovers or should have
discovered through the exercise of a reasonable care and diligence facts
140
In this case, after the
establishing the elements of a cause of action.”
patent issued including the alleged claim drafting error, plaintiff retained
an attorney from another patent law firm to obtain additional patent
141
Within the scope of his
protection in the same technical area.
assignment and prior to the critical date for triggering the statute of
limitations, plaintiff’s attorney reviewed the patent in question, including
142
On the basis of this
the file history, prior art, and claim scope.
finding, the court concluded that the reviewing attorney knew or should
have known of the drafting error prior to the critical time and imputed
this knowledge to plaintiff as of that date; hence plaintiff’s claim was
143
barred.
It is interesting to note that there is no mention of case-within-acase, and only the following reference to patent infringement: “As a
determination of patent infringement serves as the basis of § 1338
jurisdiction over related state law claims, so does a determination of
claim scope. After all, claim scope determination is the first step of a
patent infringement analysis.”144 There is, however, no indication that
the court would require the plaintiff in Immunocept II to prove patent
145
Because the
infringement by a prospective licensee or otherwise.
court decides the case on the statute of limitation issue, it does not reach
the damage issue.146 The damages alleged by the plaintiff as reported in
the district court opinion are: “lost profits, lost royalties, loss of time
147
The plaintiff clearly
and money expended, and other remedial costs.”
is not claiming that its damages are based on its failure to prove
148
The plaintiff lost an
infringement because of the error in claiming.
opportunity to license the patent because of the claiming error149 (not

139. See id. at 1286.
140. Id. (citing Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118, 121 (Tex. 2001)).
141. Id. at 1283.
142. Id. at 1286.
143. Id. at 1287-88.
144. Id. at 1285 (citation omitted).
145. See id. at 1284-85.
146. Id. at 1289.
147. Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP (Immunocept I), No. A-05-CA-334-SS,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96912, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2006).
148. Id.
149. Immunocept II, 504 F.3d at 1286.
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unlike AMT’s loss of opportunity to settle the underlying case at a
150
The prospective licensee presumably desired broader
higher level).
patent protection to exploit the invention.151 The causation element of
the case-within-a-case would appear to be: But for the negligence in
drafting the claims, the plaintiff would have licensed the patent and
would have profited from this whether or not anyone infringed the
broadened patent. Hence, the case-within-a-case methodology would be
satisfied by loss of revenue from the failure to license, rather than by any
hypothetical infringement by the potential licensee, with the proviso that
the broader claim was found to be otherwise patentable.152
While not explicit, it would appear that the court in Immunocept II
is recognizing the “non-judgment” model by basing jurisdiction on the
free-standing issue of claim-scope independent of any requirement that
plaintiff prove infringement of claims of a non-negligently drafted
scope.153 There is no indication that the plaintiff would have to prove a
judgment against anyone for infringement or otherwise, but plaintiff
would only have to prove “lost profits, lost royalties, loss of time and
money expended, and other remedial costs.”154 With this understanding,
that this is a non-judgment underlying case, jurisdiction may be seen as
arising from the issue of claim-scope, raising a substantial question of
patent law necessary for the resolution of the malpractice case. In the
context of the malpractice case, the issue of claim-scope would seem to
fall within the breach (standard of care) element of whether a reasonable
patent attorney would have employed an “open” rather than a “closed”
transition, presuming the drafting attorney had a duty to include claims
of “reasonable” scope and that such claims with “open” transition would
have been granted to establish the causation element to the loss of the
license agreement. Thus, it may be inferred that the breach element in
the malpractice case raised a significant question of patent law sufficient
to grant federal jurisdiction independent over any requirement that
infringement be established.
155
decided in 2009 by the
Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr,
Federal Circuit (opinion by Judge Laurie, joined by Judges Gaharsa and
Prost), dealt with the issue of personal jurisdiction:
150. See Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Field, L.L.P., 504 F.3d
1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
151. See Immunocept II, 504 F.3d at 1283.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
153. Immunocept II, 504 F.3d at 1285-86.
154. See Immunocept I, No. A-05-CA-334-SS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96912, at *4 (W.D. Tex.
Mar. 24, 2006).
155. Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d 1403 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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The question presented in this case is one of first impression, viz.,
whether the act of filing an application for a U.S. patent at the USPTO
is sufficient to subject the filing attorney to personal jurisdiction in a
malpractice claim that is based upon that filing and is brought in
156
federal court.

The plaintiff retained a Canadian intellectual property firm to obtain
patent protection in Canada and other countries, including the United
States.157 The defendant firm filed a Canadian patent application, which
included the source code required in the invention to enable it, and the
158
However, the source code was
Canadian patent subsequently issued.
omitted from the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) application that was
filed in the United Kingdom and, subsequently, in the national phase in
the United State Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO), located in
Alexandria, Virginia.159 The plaintiff sought to enforce the U.S. patent,
which subsequently issued, but it was held invalid due to
160
Plaintiff
“indefiniteness” based on the absence of the source code.
then brought a malpractice action against the Canadian firm in the
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which dismissed the
case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant firm who had
not entered Virginia.161
The Federal Circuit reversed on the basis of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(k)(2).162 The first requirement of this rule is that plaintiff’s
claim arises under federal law.163 In this instance, the court easily finds
“arising under” jurisdiction stating:
Just as in Immunocept, this case concerns state malpractice claims that
involve analysis of patent claims and proof of invalidity. Touchcom
will be required to show that, had appellees not omitted a portion of
the source code from its application, the resulting U.S. patent would
164
not have been held invalid.

The court cites Virginia law as requiring proof of “but for” causation “by
165
Thus, for the plaintiff to prevail in the
conducting a trial within trial.”

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 1409.
Id. at 1407.
Id.
Id. at 1408.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1418.
Id. at 1412.
Id. at 1413.
Id. (citing White v. Morano, 452 S.E.2d 856, 858 (Va. 1995)).
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malpractice case, it would have to prove that, but for the absence of the
source code, the patent would not have been found invalid and would
166
Immunocept does “involve analysis of patent
have been infringed.
claims,” but does not require “proof of invalidity” for plaintiff to prevail
because the plaintiff alleges damage not because the “closed” transition
claims were invalid, but because they were too narrow for successful
licensing.167 In Touchcom, however, the judgment model is followed, as
the plaintiff is claiming that it would have obtained a favorable judgment
of infringement but for the negligent conduct of the defendants in failing
to include the source code rendering the patent invalid.168 As the subject
matter jurisdiction and malpractice cases have common elements, case169
within-a-case-within-a-case appears to be explanatory.
170
In Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., decided on March 2, 2010,
the Federal Circuit (opinion by Judge Moore, joined by Judges Newman
and Bryson) for the first time considered in certain issues of substantive
patent malpractice law in addition to the jurisdictional issue.171 The case
arose in 2003, when the plaintiff contacted the defendant patent attorney,
who then was employed by the defendant patent law firm, concerning
patent protection on her inventions, including international patent
172
The attorney responded, providing general information
protection.
with respect to the PCT, but did not mention the “absolute novelty” rule
applicable in many foreign countries regarding public use novelty
173
It appears that the plaintiff publicly used her inventions in
bars.
174
2005.
On January 20, 2006, the plaintiff filed two provisional applications
175
in the PTO. She did not contact the defendant attorney again until five
days before the critical date for the filing of non-provisional and PCT
applications.176 The patent attorney advised plaintiff that he was going
on vacation the following day and would not return until Monday (the
last date to file), and that she should forward to him immediately

166. See id.
167. Immunocept II, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh’g denied, 2006-1432, 2007
U.S. App. LEXIS 26823 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2007).
168. Touchcom, 574 F.3d at 1408.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 122-29.
170. Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., 596 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
171. Id. at 1357.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1357-58.
175. Id. at 1357.
176. Id. at 1358.
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information concerning these applications.177 The attorney returned on
Monday and proceeded to prepare three non-provisional applications
based upon plaintiff’s provisional applications and was able to file these
applications with the PTO on that day.178 However, he did not file any
179
The attorney explained to the plaintiff that she
PCT applications.
would be unable to obtain patent protection in Europe under the PCT
and that it was not worth spending the money to file the PCT
180
Subsequently, the defendant attorney withdrew his
applications.
representation of the plaintiff, and thereafter the U.S. patent applications
were abandoned.181 As a consequence, plaintiff asserts “that because
her inventions lacked patent protection her investors withdrew their
funding, particularly leaving her unable to operate the website as a
business.”182
A complaint was filed by plaintiff against the patent firm and the
patent attorney in an Ohio state court alleging malpractice in failing to
file PCT applications based upon plaintiff’s inventions.183
Subsequently, plaintiff amended this complaint to allege “defendants
committed malpractice by failing to file the three PCT applications as
well as by other omissions.”184 Shortly thereafter, defendants removed
the action to the federal district court maintaining that the “other
omissions” in the amended complaint would include claiming
negligence in preparing and then filing the U.S. applications, which thus
185
Plaintiff
raised substantial questions of patent law under § 1338(a).
testified during her “deposition that these ‘other omissions’ related
largely to [the attorney’s] alleged negligence in preparing and filing the
186
After discovery, defendants moved for summary
U.S. applications.”
judgment of dismissal, which was granted by the district court.187
188
Plaintiff appealed to the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit first dealt with the subject matter jurisdiction
question.189 To resolve this question, the court reasoned that, because
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1358-59.
Id. at 1359 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1359.
Id.
Id.
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the legal malpractice claim arose under Ohio law, the court must
determine “whether patent law is a ‘necessary element’ of a claim
190
Plaintiff’s contention was that she was
presented in her complaint.”
using alternative theories for the single claim of legal malpractice and
hence federal jurisdiction should be denied under Christianson VI, which
held “a claim supported by alternative theories in the complaint may not
form the basis for § 1338(a) jurisdiction unless patent law is essential to
each of those theories.”191 The court, however, rejected the single claim
theory, quoting the definition of a claim “as broadly defined” in Black’s
Law Dictionary as the “aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right
enforceable by a court.”192 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
plaintiff made two claims: The first claim is with respect to the failure
to file the PCT applications, with the court concluding, “It is undisputed
that Ms. Davis’s allegations relating to the PCT applications do not raise
193
However, the second claim for “other
any issue of U.S. patent law.”
omissions,” which plaintiff maintained was due to negligence in the
194
With respect to
“preparation and filing of the U.S. applications” does.
the “other omissions” claim as authorizing federal jurisdiction, the court
turned to what it refers to as “Ohio’s ‘case-within-a-case’ doctrine,”
stating, “This doctrine applies in certain malpractice cases to require the
plaintiff to prove that she would have been successful in the underlying
195
The court then discussed two
matter but for the alleged malpractice.”
196
and Environmental Network Corp. v.
Ohio cases, Vahila v. Hall
Goodman Weiss Miller, L.L.P.197
In Vahila, the plaintiffs’ allegation of negligence was that the
defendants had not fully disclosed to them various proposed plea
bargains and settlement arrangement and had caused the plaintiffs to
enter into them due to duress and coercion.198 The Ohio Supreme Court
199
particularly
found one of its previous cases, Krahn v. Kinney,
relevant, where the defendant attorney had failed to disclose a plea
bargain to a client where criminal charges would have been dismissed,
and the court held that the fact that the client may not have prevailed in

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1360 (quoting Christianson VI, 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988)).
Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 264 (8th ed. 2004)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Vahila v. Hall, 674 N.E.2d 1164 (Ohio 1997).
Envtl. Network Corp. v. Goodman Weiss Miller, L.L.P., 893 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio 2008).
Vahila, 674 N.E.2d at 1169.
Krahn v. Kinney, 538 N.E.2d 1058 (1989).
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the underlying case did not preclude recovery in a malpractice case
200
In rejecting imposing a mandatory requirement
against the attorney.
on a malpractice plaintiff, the Vahila court stated:
In this regard, we reject any finding that the element of causation in the
context of a legal malpractice action can be replaced or supplemented
with a rule of thumb requiring that a plaintiff, in order to establish
damage or loss, prove in every instance that he or she would have been
201
successful in the underlying matter(s) giving rise to the complaint.

As policy justification for this holding, the court stated: “[W]e cannot
endorse a blanket proposition that requires a plaintiff to prove, in every
instance, that he or she would have been successful in the underlying
matter. Such a requirement would be unjust, making any recovery
virtually impossible for those who truly have a meritorious legal
202
The Federal Circuit, however, qualifies the
malpractice claim.”
breadth of this justification by quoting from Vahila: “[T]he requirement
of causation often dictates that the merits of the malpractice action
depend upon the merits of the underlying case. Naturally, a plaintiff in a
legal malpractice action may be required, depending on the situation, to
provide some evidence of the merits of the underlying claim.”203
The Federal Circuit then turns to a 2008 decision of the Ohio
204
and relies upon how that
Supreme Court, Environmental Network,
court distinguished Vahila:
In Environmental Network, the appellees alleged that their attorneys
had coerced them into settling the case. As their sole claim for
recovery, the appellees argued that they would have obtained a better
result if the case had been tried to conclusion. . . . The court observed
that “unlike the plaintiffs in Vahila, who sustained losses regardless of
whether their underlying case was meritorious,” the appellees could
prove causation and damages only if they established that “they would
have succeeded in the underlying case and that the judgment would
205
have been better than the terms of the settlement.”

The Federal Circuit then concluded that the plaintiff’s malpractice case
here is analogous to the issue in Environmental Network, stating,

200. Vahila, 674 N.E.2d at 1167-68.
201. Id. at 1168.
202. Id. at 1170.
203. Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., 596 F.3d 1355, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting
Vahila, 674 N.E. at 1170).
204. Envtl. Network Corp. v. Goodman Weiss Miller LLP, 893 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio 2008).
205. Davis, 596 F.3d at 1361 (quoting Envtl. Network, 893 N.E.2d at 177-78).
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“Unless plaintiff would have received patents on her inventions if the
applications had been competently drafted, that is, unless her inventions
were patentable, the patent attorney’s negligence would not have caused
her to suffer any damages.”206 This conclusion is consistent with the
plaintiff’s allegation of damages: “[B]ecause her inventions lacked
patent protection her investors withdrew their funding, leaving her
unable to operate The IP-Exchange as a business.”207
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit court concluded that, because the
plaintiff would have had to prove that she would have obtained patents
on her inventions but for the attorney’s negligence, this raised a
substantial question of federal patent law and granted subject matter
jurisdiction to the court under § 1338(a).208 This analysis of jurisdiction
would appear to raise the substantial question of patent law in the
causation element of the malpractice claim. The court does not address
the damage element, apparently presuming damage from the failure to
obtain patents.209 Thus, it would appear that the court is following a
non-judgment model, leaving it to plaintiff to prove actual damages of a
non-judgment type in the malpractice case but resolving the
jurisdictional question on the causation element, raising a significant
210
question of patent law.
With respect to evidentiary questions, the Federal Circuit applied
the law of the regional circuit, in this case the Sixth Circuit, which uses
211
Plaintiff’s patent expert had stated in
an abuse of discretion standard.
a deposition that he had not undertaken a patentability analysis;
however, in support of a motion for partial summary judgment, the
expert had stated that “the patentability of an invention can be and
routinely is performed without knowing what claims will eventually be
212
On the basis of
made . . . [or] issue in a patent on that invention.”

206. Id.
207. Id. at 1358. However, had damages been framed in terms that the funding was withdrawn
because of the abandonment of the applications and the loss of patent pending status, Vahila would
seem to raise the question whether the ultimate patentability of plaintiff’s inventions was necessary
for recovery. Id. If so, then federal jurisdiction could be questioned unless there is a substantial
question of patent law raised without a determination of patentability. Id. Certainly, patent
applications may have value even if they ultimately prove unpatentable. Id. A classic example of
this is Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979), where the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the licensor of the patent application on a keyholder could continue to receive royalties even
after the application had been abandoned.
208. Davis, 596 F.3d at 1361-62.
209. Id. at 1361.
210. Id. at 1361-62.
211. Id. at 1362.
212. Id.
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such a patentability analysis, the expert concluded that plaintiff’s
213
The district court struck this section from
inventions were patentable.
the expert’s affidavit, and the Federal Circuit affirmed on the basis that
this was not an abuse of discretion based on the inconsistent deposition
testimony and the failure to include any patentability opinion in his
214
original expert report.
In affirming the grant of a summary judgment, the Federal Circuit
also followed the law of the regional circuit and quotes from a Sixth
Circuit case: “[c]onclusory statements unadorned with supporting facts
are insufficient to establish a factual judgment.”215 In the Davis case,
the plaintiff’s expert patent attorney had not undertaken a patentability
study of the U.S. application but had only opined that the plaintiff would
have been granted patents but for defendant patent attorney’s
216
The court found these statements to be conclusory and
negligence.
affirmed the grant of summary judgment for failure to introduce
evidence sufficient to raise a material issue of fact.217 By deciding the
summary judgment issue on the causation element of the malpractice
case, the court avoided the damage element, which could be a significant
obstacle in this and many cases.218 It should also be noted that the court
also held that “the case-within-a-case doctrine applies to [plaintiff’s]
219
Because
malpractice claim relating to the PCT applications.”
plaintiff’s expert offered no evidence concerning the patentability of
these applications, the grant of summary judgment by the district court
was appropriate. Presumably, federal jurisdiction over the “PCT claim”
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1364 (quoting Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 560 (6th Cir. 2009)).
Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1364.
As stated in MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 21:3 (speculative damages):
The rule is that an attorney is not liable for a damage claim that is remote or
speculative. A related, but different issue, is whether the causal relationship between the
alleged error and damages is speculative. The test of whether damages are remote or
speculative has nothing to do with the difficulty in calculating the amount but concerns
the more basic question of whether there are any damages, which focuses on the fact of
damages, rather than the amount. Analytically, the inquiry is for causation, i.e. whether
the attorney’s conduct caused any injury.
Thus, there must be the fact of present injury. The mere possibility, or even
probability, that the plaintiff will sustain an injury at some time does not alter the
speculative nature of the damage claim, and, therefore, does not support a cause of action
for legal malpractice for that damage claim. Of course, the plaintiff can pursue those
damages claims that are not speculative.
See A. Samuel Oddi, Patent Attorney Malpractice: An Oxymoron No More, 2004 U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
& POL’Y 1, 44-49 (2004) (discussing the damage element in patent attorney malpractice cases).
219. Davis, 596 F.3d at 1363 (emphasis added).
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was based upon supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a),220
parasitic to the “other omissions” claim arising under § 1338(a).
On March 11, 2010, nine days after Davis was decided, the Federal
Circuit in a split decision, Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v.
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. (Lab. Corp. IV),221 (opinion by Judge
Gaharsa, joined by Judge Moore, Judge Dyk dissenting) seemingly
backed somewhat away from a broad interpretation of what constituted a
222
significant question of federal patent law in a licensing case.
Metabolite, the licensor, had prevailed in a previous case against
LabCorp, the licensee, with a holding that the licensed patent had been
infringed by the licensee’s medical assays and hence the license was
breached and terminated.223 This decision was affirmed by the Federal
Circuit.224 LabCorp then outsourced the assays to be performed by a
licensed third party under the patent and brought a declaratory judgment
against Metabolite to confirm the legality of this under the judgment in
effect.225 The district court granted a summary judgment to LabCorp on
226
and Metabolite
the basis that the license had been terminated,
appealed to the Federal Circuit, moving for dismissal or transfer of the
appeal to the Tenth Circuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.227
The majority of the court agreed with the licensor that it did not
have jurisdiction based on its interpretation of Grable:
Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Grable, addressing
general federal question jurisdiction refined the Christianson two-part
test for § 1338 jurisdiction by requiring a determination of whether “a
state-law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually
disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without

220. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006) (“Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case
or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”).
221. Lab. Corp IV, 599 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
222. See id. at 1279.
223. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings (Lab. Corp. I), 370 F.3d 1354, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
224. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings (Lab. Corp. II), No. 99-CV-870,
2001 WL 34778749 (D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2001).
225. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc. (Lab. Corp. III), 571 F. Supp. 2d
1199, 1204 (D. Colo. 2008).
226. Id. at 1215.
227. Lab. Corp. IV, 599 F.3d 1277, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state
228
judicial responsibilities.

With respect to Air Measurement and Immunocept, the court concluded:
Such cases are distinguishable because the instant matter does not
present a “case[-]within[-]a[-]case.” Here, it is undisputed that the
post-trial conduct falls within the scope of the [licensed] patent. While
the finding of breach is based on a finding of infringement, the district
court would not have to conduct an infringement analysis because [the
original case] established infringement and neither party contests that
229
decision.

The dissent disagreed that there was no “actually disputed and
substantial” federal question in that there had not been a determination
by the court that outsourced assays are covered by the patent and the res
judicata effect of the prior decision, and, moreover, once jurisdiction has
been established, it is not deprived of jurisdiction because the federal
issue becomes undisputed.230
In any event, upon transfer from the Federal Circuit, the Tenth
231
Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment concluding:
On appeal, Metabolite advances several arguments suggesting that the
License Agreement was never properly terminated:
Regardless of the strength of these arguments, we conclude that
Metabolite is estopped from making them. What Metabolite once
called a “termination,” it now attempts to relabel a mere “breach.” But
the first jury found termination, at Metabolite’s urging and to
LabCorp’s detriment, and that finding binds us. Metabolite cannot
have its cake and eat it too. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28
232
U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

Needless to say, no question of patent law, substantial or not, was
involved in this resolution, and certainly there was no need for the use of
case-within-a-case methodology.
In April 2010, the Federal Circuit (opinion by Judge Bryson, joined
by Judges Archer and Prost) also declined jurisdiction in Clearplay, Inc.
v. Abecassis,233 which involved a dispute over a license agreement

228. Id. at 1282 (emphasis added).
229. Id. at 1284.
230. See id. at 1287-90 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
231. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc. (Lab. Corp. V), 410 Fed. App’x
152, 160 (10th Cir. 2011).
232. Id. at 152-53.
233. Clearplay, Inc. v. Abecassis, 602 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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entered into by the parties to settle a patent infringement suit.234 Shortly
after the settlement, the licensor asserted that the licensee had violated
the agreement and filed a motion in the same district court as the patent
case was filed to enforce the agreement.235 The licensor also notified
several retailers selling the licensee’s products that they were not
236
The licensor
licensed and their sale would constitute infringement.
then brought a diversity action in the same district court, accusing the
licensor of “tortious interference with a contractual relationship, tortious
interference with potential advantageous business relationships, breach
of the license agreement, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and violation of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act.”237 The district court held that the license agreement was valid and
enforceable and granted the licensee a preliminary injunction enjoining
238
the licensor from advising the licensee’s customers to the contrary.
The licensor then appealed to the Federal Circuit and the licensor
asserted that this court did not have jurisdiction and the appeal should be
239
to the Eleventh Circuit.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the licensee that it did not have
jurisdiction over this appeal.240 The court reasoned:
While it is true that questions of patent infringement are addressed
at various points in the communications that are at issue in [the
licensee’s] complaint, and while it is possible that patent law issues
could arise in the course of litigating any one of [the licensee’s] claims,
it is equally clear that none of those claims necessarily turns on an
issue of patent law. That is, in the case of each asserted claim, there is
at least one theory of relief that would not require the resolution of a
241
patent law issue.

The court then makes clear the limits and specificity of its jurisdiction:
Christianson embraces a distinctly non-holistic approach to “arising
under” jurisdiction. It is not enough that patent law issues are in the
air. Instead, resolution of a patent law issue must be necessary to

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1364-65.
Id. at 1365.
Id.
Id. at 1365-66.
Id. at 1366.
Id.
Id. at 1368.

10- ODDI_MACRO_NEW FOOTNOTES FINAL.DOCM

2012]

5/25/2012 1:16 PM

PATENT ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE

103

every theory of relief under at least one claim in the plaintiff’s
242
complaint. And that is not so in this case.

The emphasis on the inadequacy of patent law issues that are floating
somewhere out there “in the air” is reminiscent of famous admonition of
Justice Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.: “Proof of
negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.”243 In the context of
patent attorney malpractice, the case-within-a-case methodology should
aid in the identification of specific patent law issues within the required
elements of the malpractice cause of action and hence filter them out of
244
the “air.”
In Carter v. ALK Holdings, Inc. (Carter II),245 decided in May
2010, the Federal Circuit (opinion by Judge Dyk, joined by Chief Judge
Michel, Judge Newman concurring and dissenting in part) expanded its
jurisdictional net to include malpractice claims based upon breach of
fiduciary duty in addition to those based upon professional
negligence.246 The federal district court had imposed sanctions under
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on a law firm for
pleading a federal cause of action based upon breach of fiduciary duty
under “the Patent Act, the Code of Federal Regulations [‘CFR’], and the
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure [‘MPEP’].”247 The underlying
rational for the allegation of breach of fiduciary duty was the conflict
created by defendant firm in representing both the plaintiff and another
party with respect to the same invention.248 The district court had
concluded that, because no federal cause of action exists for breach of
fiduciary duty under federal patent law, the CFR or the MPEP, it did not
have jurisdiction.249 The Federal Circuit rejected this view of “arising
under” jurisdiction limited to the first prong of Christianson and held:
Here, the determination of [the patent attorney’s] compliance with the
MPEP and the CFR is a necessary element of [the plaintiff’s]
malpractice cause of action because the CFR and the MPEP establish
[the patent attorney’s] expected fiduciary duties to his clients. Count

242. Id. at 1369 (emphasis added).
243. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (citing SIR FREDERICK
POLLOCK, POLLOCK’S LAW OF TORTS 455 (11th ed. 1920)). Justice Cardozo had also used this
quotation earlier in Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (N.Y. 1920) in the context of causation.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
245. Carter v. ALK Holdings, Inc. (Carter II), 605 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
246. See id. at 1325.
247. Carter v. ALK Holdings, Inc. (Carter I), 510 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1307 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
248. Carter II, 605 F.2d at 1322.
249. Id.
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VIII [breach of fiduciary duty] thus involves a substantial question of
250
federal patent law and is not frivolous.

It may be noted that there is no mention of any case-within-a-case
or of causation or of damages suffered by the plaintiff.251 Pure and
simple, this is a subject matter jurisdiction case.252 The Federal Circuit
finds the substantial question of patent law in the fiduciary duty and its
253
This analysis should also follow when the basis of
breach elements.
the malpractice action is negligence, where plaintiff must allege a duty
254
Hence, a substantial question of
owed and a breach of that duty.
patent law for jurisdiction purposes can arise, according to the foregoing
interpretation of Immunocept and Carter, with respect to any element of
the malpractice case. However, in all instances, the plaintiff in the
malpractice case on whatever theory (negligence, breach of fiduciary
duty, breach of contract, fraud) must prove it suffered actual damages
causally related to the alleged malpractice by the defendant patent
attorney, i.e. the case-within-a-case methodology, within a non255
judgment model.
In January 2011, the Federal Circuit (opinion by Judge Bryson,
joined by Judges Newman and Prost) decided Warrior Sports, Inc. v.
Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C.,256 where the facts of the case were quite
257
Warrior sued a competitor for
similar to Air Measurement.
infringement of its patent in federal district court.258 The competitor
defended on the ground that the patent was unenforceable because of
259
The trial was bifurcated, with the inequitable
inequitable conduct.
conduct defense being tried first.260 The infringement case was settled
prior to a decision on inequitable conduct.261 Thus, the infringement
262
Warrior then filed a malpractice action in a
issue was never litigated.

250. Id. at 1325 (footnote omitted).
251. See id. at 1323-25.
252. See id. at 1325.
253. See id.
254. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 49 cmt. c (2000) (“Most rules applicable to negligence actions also apply to actions for breach of
fiduciary duty.”).
255. See ASTech, LLC v. Husick, 676 F. Supp. 2d 389, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
256. Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C. (Warrior II), 631 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
257. See id. at 1369-70.
258. Id. at 1369.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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Michigan state court against its patent attorneys, alleging damages on
the basis of “diminished settlement value” and also because of failure to
263
timely pay maintenance fees on the patent, which resulted in its lapse.
By stipulation, the malpractice case was dismissed from the state court
264
Seemingly directly contrary to
and refiled in the federal district court.
Air Measurement, the district court held that it did not have jurisdiction,
concluding: “[T]he issues implicated in the underlying disputes—
maintenance fees and timeliness of reinstatement proceedings—do not
appear to be matters of importance in the development of patent law.”265
No mention was made by the court of the inequitable conduct defense as
perhaps raising a significant question of patent law.
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court following Air
Measurement stating:
If the accused products do not infringe the ‘216 patent, then the
availability of the inequitable conduct defense did not proximately
cause any harm to Warrior. That is, to prove the proximate cause and
injury elements of its tort claim, Michigan law requires Warrior to
show that it would have prevailed on its infringement claim against
STX and would have been entitled to an award of damages as a
266
result.

This rationale is indeed the same as Air Management, ignoring that the
underlying case had been settled and the damages claimed by Warrior
267
If the Federal Circuit had dealt
were for diminished settlement value.
with the malpractice case for jurisdictional purposes as a “nonjudgment” one rather than as a “judgment” one requiring that the
malpractice plaintiff Warrior prove infringement of its patent, federal
jurisdiction would be justified on the inequitable conduct issue, which, if
established, would render the patent unenforceable—surely a substantial
268
The evident use of the “case-within-a-casequestion of patent law.
within-a-case” for jurisdiction thus forces the plaintiff to prove
infringement even though it is not claiming infringement damages but
rather loss of settlement value damages.
As of the date of this writing, the most recent case decided by the
Federal Circuit in November 2011 is Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans,
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C. (Warrior I), 632 F. Supp. 2d 694, 699
(E.D. Mich. 2009).
266. Warrior II, 631 F.3d at 1372.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 119-29.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
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LLP,269 as an unpublished or nonprecedental opinion.270 (Opinion by
Judge O’Malley, joined by Judge Gaharsa, Judge Lourie joining
Sections I, III, and IV but concurring only in result of Section II.)
Plaintiff Byrne obtained a patent for an improvement in a string weed
trimmer, which included a guide having a “generally planar . . .
surface.”271 After negotiations broke down with Black & Decker,
plaintiff brought an infringement action in the U.S. District Court for the
272
The court granted a directed verdict
Eastern District of Kentucky.
against plaintiff, finding that Black & Decker’s trimmer did not contain
a generally planar surface.”273 The Federal Circuit affirmed this
decision, although on a different construction of the “planar”
274
Plaintiff then filed a malpractice action against defendant
limitation.
patent attorneys in a Kentucky state court.275 Defendant attorneys
276
which held that it had
removed the case to the same district court,
277
jurisdiction citing Air Measurement.
Plaintiff argued that he could

269. Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, No. 2011-1012, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2011).
270. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 provides that:
A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions, orders,
judgments, or other written dispositions that have been:
(i) designated as “unpublished,” “not for publication,” “non-precedential,” “not
precedent,” or the like; and
(ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.
FED. R. APP. P. 32.1. The Federal Circuit Local Rule 32.1(d) states that:
The court may refer to a nonprecedential disposition in an opinion or order and may look
to a nonprecedential disposition for guidance or persuasive reasoning, but will not give
one of its own nonprecedential dispositions the effect of binding precedent. The court
will not consider nonprecedential dispositions of another court as binding precedent of
that court unless the rules of that court so provide.
FED. CIR. R. 32.1(d). Other federal circuit courts have also generally held that unpublished opinions
have no binding precedential value aside from their reasoning and analysis. See, e.g., Doe v.
Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1215 n.10 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e are not bound by this
Court's unpublished decisions”); In re Grant, 635 F.3d 1227, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[U]npublished
orders like those the amicus cites may be considered persuasive authority, but they do not constrain
a panel of the court from reaching a contrary conclusion in a published opinion after full
consideration of the issue.”); United States v. Keith, 559 F.3d 499, 505 (6th Cir. 2009) (Although
unpublished decisions do not have precedential authority . . . they may be considered for their
persuasive value in our analysis) (citations omitted).
271. Byrne, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127, at *2.
272. Byrne v. Black & Decker Corp., No. 2004-262 (WOB), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24104, at
*6 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 27, 2006), aff’d, 235 Fed. App’x 741.
273. Id. at *12-15, *18.
274. Byrne, 235 Fed. App’x at 746.
275. Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, No. 2: 08-102-DCR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
61962 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 13, 2008).
276. Id. at *2.
277. Id. at *12-13.
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have been granted claims without the “planar” limitation and offered an
affidavit by the inventor Byrne setting forth the technical basis for
278
However, the district court granted defendant attorney’s motion
this.
for summary judgment, sua sponte, concluding that plaintiff inventor did
not qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art and hence his affidavit
did not satisfy the requirement of technical expert testimony.279 Plaintiff
appealed to the Federal Circuit, which reversed the district court finding
that it had “abused its discretion in striking Byrne’s affidavit without
identifying the relevant level of skill in the art and without considering
that inventors normally possess at least ordinary skill in the field of
invention . . .”280
Judge O’Malley joined by Judge Gajarsa, however, was not willing
to let the matter rest with the reversal. In Section II of the opinion, the
281
Plaintiff had
subject matter jurisdiction question was resurrected.
argued in his brief that “legal malpractice cases that involve only
hypothetical patent claims” should not be subject to § 1338 federal
282
This argument, however, was abandoned by plaintiff in
jurisdiction.
his reply brief as being precluded by Federal Circuit precedent.283
Judges O’Malley and Gajarsa nonetheless, sua sponte, found merit in
284
this argument but agreed the court was bound by its precedent.
285
As precedent, Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A.
is cited with
the following parenthetical:
“(finding jurisdiction over a legal
malpractice action involving missed deadlines in which no patent
actually issued.)”286 It should be noted that jurisdiction in Davis was not
granted because of “missed deadlines,” but rather, as explained above,287
because of “other omissions,” including the patent attorney’s “alleged
negligence in preparing and filing the U.S. applications.”288 The
“missed deadlines” in Davis were with respect to PCT applications,
which the court held that it did not have § 1338 jurisdiction: “It is

278. Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, No. 2: 08-102-DCR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
66557 (E.D. Ky. July 30, 2009).
279. Id. at *16-17.
280. Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, 2011-1012, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127, at *1
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2011).
281. Id. at *5-6.
282. Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
283. Id.
284. Id. at *5-6. Judge Lourie only concurred in the result of Section II.
285. Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., 596 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
286. Byrne, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127, at *13.
287. See text accompanying notes 170-220.
288. Davis, 569 F.3d at 1360-62.
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undisputed that Ms. Davis’s allegations relating to the PCT applications
289
do not raise any issue of U.S. patent law.”
Judge O’Malley then concludes:
Although we must adhere to our precedent, we believe this court
should re-evaluate the question of whether jurisdiction exists to
entertain a state law malpractice claim involving the validity of a
290
hypothetical patent, for the reasons discussed below.

It is not apparent why Judge O’Malley replaced “hypothetical patent
claims” with “validity of a hypothetical patent.”291
The basis for plea for reevaluation of the jurisdictional scope is the
292
The basic question raised in
Supreme Court’s decision in Grable.
Grable was whether the assumption of federal jurisdiction would
“disturb[] any congressionally approved balance of federal and state
judicial responsibilities.”293 The majority reasons that the balance is
289. Id. at 1360.
290. Byrne, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127, at *5 (emphasis in original).
291. Are these terms being used interchangeably? Or is “hypothetical patent” intended to
include “hypothetical patent claims” as a species of the generic “hypothetical patent? Other
questions also are raised. For example, Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump, 504 F.3d 1262
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 82-129) would appear to fall within the
Byrne exception because for the plaintiff to prevail, the court would have to determine whether the
patents would have been enforceable had the defenses been asserted claims and would have been
infringed. It would also appear that federal jurisdiction would be denied in Immunocept, LLC v.
Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (discussed supra text accompanying
notes 130-54) because it involved the construction of a hypothetical claim including an open
transition compared to the actual claim that included a closed transition phrase. Touchcom, Inc. v.
Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d 1403 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 155-69)
may be seen as involving a hypothetical patent including the source code that allegedly was
negligently not included in the patent held to be invalid. Davis, 596 F.3d 1355 (discussed supra text
accompanying notes 170-220) also would involve a hypothetical patent which did not issue because
of the alleged malpractice of the defendant attorney. Carter v. ALK Holdings, Inc., 605 F.3d 1319
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 245-55) does not seem to involve a
hypothetical patent or patent claim because the case-within-a-case methodology is not reached, with
federal jurisdiction being based on the interpretation of the CFR and the MPEP on a conflict of
interest allegation of violation of the attorney’s fiduciary duty to the client. In Warrior Sports, Inc.
v. Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C., 631 F.3d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (discussed supra text accompanying
notes 256-68), the last jurisdictional case decided by the Federal Circuit prior to Byrne, an actual
patent was involved in the underlying infringement case, which was settled prior to reaching the
infringement issue. In the malpractice case, the issue to be decided was whether the actual patent
was infringed and, if so, whether it was unenforceable because of inequitable conduct. Does this
make it a hypothetical patent or hypothetical claim because the actual patent could not now be
infringed by the litigation defendant, who was licensed under the settlement? On the other hand, a
finding of inequitable conduct in the malpractice case could have some bearing on the actual patent
if still in force.
292. Byrne, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127, at *6. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70
for discussion of Grable.
293. Byrne, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127, at *5.
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likely to be disturbed by federal courts deciding malpractice cases
involving “hypothetical claims” and that such determinations tend to be
“factbound and situation-specific,” involving “only application and not
interpretation of patent law,” and having “little or no bearing on other
294
cases.”
To support further its application of Grable, the court cites two
federal district court cases that find limited federal interest in cases
295
and quoted, evidently with approval, from
where no patent issued
Minton v. Gunn (Minton I),296 a Texas state appellate court, “[W]e
believe the Federal Circuit misapplied United States Supreme Court
precedent by disregarding the federalism analysis that the Supreme
Court has applied to restrict the scope of ‘arising under’ jurisdiction to a
‘small and special category’ of cases . . . .”).297 The Byrne panel did not
have access to the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Minton II,
reversing the appellate court. A detailed analysis of the Texas Supreme
Court’s opinion in Minton II appears below.298
Byrne then petitioned for en banc rehearing by the Federal
Circuit.299 This was denied with Judge Dyk writing an opinion
supporting the denial, with whom Judges Newman and Lourie joined;
Judges Bryson, Linn, Prost, and Reyna also were in favor of denial;
Judges O’Malley dissented from the denial of the petition, writing an
opinion joined by Judge Wallach; in addition, Chief Judge Rader and
Judge Moore dissented from the denial. Thus, rehearing was denied by a
vote of seven to four.
Judge Dyk supported denial of the petition asserting that the court’s
prior decisions in upholding federal jurisdiction were fully consistent
with Christiansen and “within the meaning of Grable,” concluding: “In
so holding, we have recognized the strong federal interest in patent law
uniformity as manifested by Congress’s decision to give exclusive
jurisdiction to the federal district courts and on appeal to this court.” He
so concludes: “The existence of these issues necessarily makes the
issues ‘substantial’ within the meaning of Christianson, . . . and
indicates a ‘serious federal interest’ in federal adjudication within the
294. Id. at *5 (citing Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700-01
(2006)).
295. Id. at *6 (citing Genelink Biosciences, Inc. v. Colby, 722 F. Supp. 2d 592, 598-99 (D.N.J.
2010); Roof Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Hill, 679 F. Supp. 2d 749, 754 (N.D. Tex. 2010)).
296. Minton I, 301 S.W.3d 702 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009), rev’d, 355 S.W.3d 634.
297. Byrne, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23127, at *16-17 (quoting Minton I, 301 S.W.3d at 709).
298. Minton II, 355 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2011). See infra text accompanying notes 379-97.
299. Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, No. 2011-1012, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6021
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 22, 2012) (per curiam).
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meaning of Grable . . .”300 In addition, Judge Dyk raises the federal
interest in regulating attorney practice before the PTO and the federal
courts in patent matters, concluding: “There is a substantial federal
interest in preventing state courts from imposing incorrect patent law
standards for proceedings that will exclusively occur before the PTO and
the federal courts.”301
In her vigorous twenty-eight page dissent to the denial of en banc
rehearing, Judge O’Malley would appear to set the stage for a petition
for certiorari to the Supreme Court signaling: “Rather than force the
Supreme Court to correct our jurisdictional mistakes, we should take this
302
opportunity to do so ourselves.”
Her argument basically is that the Federal Circuit’s “reading of
Christianson is wrong,”303 and that the following four elements from
Grable must be satisfied before federal jurisdiction may be asserted:
[W]hether: (1) a federal issue is a necessary element of a state law
claim; (2) a federal issue is actually disputed; (3) a federal issue is
substantial; and (4) exercising federal jurisdiction will disturb the
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities. In choosing to
exercise jurisdiction over malpractice claims arising out of patent
304
matters, we have ignored the latter two parts of the inquiry.

With regard to resolving the “substantiality” element, Judge O’Malley
305
offers the following “considerations” :
As to substantiality of the federal issue, the Supreme Court, and
regional circuit courts applying Supreme Court decisions, have
identified certain considerations that affect whether a federal issue is
“substantial”: (1) if the issue is a “pure question of law,” rather than
one that is “fact-bound and situation-specific”; (2) the federal
government’s interest in the issue, including whether it implicates a
federal agency’s ability to vindicate its rights in a federal forum and
whether resolution of the issue would be controlling in numerous other

300. Id. at *4.
301. Id. at *7.
302. Id. at *10 (O’Malley, J., dissenting). Subsequently, Judge O’Malley dissented in a similar
denial of en banc rehearing in Memorylink Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 2010—1533, 2012 LEXIS
U.S. App. 7292 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 11, 2012).
303. Id. at *9.
304. Id. at *9-10 (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S.
308, 314 (2005)).
305. Citing in support of these considerations: Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v.
McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700-01 (2006) (analyzing Grable, 545 U.S. at 313); Adventure Outdoors,
Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1299-1301 (11th Cir. 2008); Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp.,
501 F.3d 555, 570 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
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cases; and (3) if resolution of the federal issue is dispositive of the case
306
at hand.

She then applies these considerations in the context of patent attorney
malpractice and finds that such cases generally (1) involve the
application of facts to a particular rule of patent law;307 (2) do not
308
involve a federal agency’s powers; or (3) have no bearing on other
cases, and state issues must still be resolved in the case.309
After this analysis, Judge O’Malley concludes: “In other words,
the [AMT] panel equated substantiality with whether the federal issue
would actually need to be resolved in the context of the state law claim.
As the discussion above demonstrates, the analysis in AMT is not only
310
incomplete, it is incorrect.”
She then turns to the “federalism” issue: “Our case law conflicts
with Supreme Court precedent in another way as well. As noted above,
Grable also requires courts to consider whether a state law claim is one
‘which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial
311
She frames the problem in terms of finding federal
responsibilities.’”
jurisdiction in every malpractice case involving a question of patent law:
“As the Fifth Circuit noted in Singh, the argument for extending federal
jurisdiction over malpractice claims involving a federal issue ‘reaches so
broadly that it would sweep innumerable state-law malpractice claims
312
Such extension, she asserts, would conflict with
into federal court.’”
313
Singh involved
Grable. However, as will be discussed below,
trademark malpractice, and the Fifth Circuit has subsequently found
federal jurisdiction in a patent malpractice case, USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery
314
Judge O’Malley dismisses USPPS: “The Fifth
Dennison Corp.

306. Byrne, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6021 at *29.
307. “In short, the patent-related malpractice claims over which we have extended our
jurisdictional reach require only application of patent laws to the facts of a case, and they do not
implicate the ‘validity, construction, or effect’ of the patent laws.” Id. at *31.
308. “Unlike in Grable, these cases also do not present situations that require courts to
determine whether an action of a federal agency complied with a federal statute.” Id. at *33-34.
However, if validity of a patent is involved in a malpractice case, the compliance of the PTO with
the patent statute is likely to be in issue.
309. The duty and breach issues will generally require the application of state malpractice law.
See id. at *9.
310. Id. at *37.
311. Id. at *38 (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308,
314 (2005)).
312. Id. at *39 (citing Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 2008)).
313. See text accompanying notes 327-34.
314. USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 647 F.3d 274, 280-82 (5th Cir. 2011).
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Circuit’s analysis in USPPS is erroneous for the same reasons our case
law is incorrect. The USPPS case also demonstrates that our case law
continues to upset the federalism balance by extending federal question
jurisdiction to cases even beyond those asserting traditional malpractice
315
claims.”
To reach the proper balance between federal and state interest,
Judge O’Malley maintains that: “But we must be mindful of the fact
that the patent issues in these cases are only incidental to the state law
tort claim, and that states have at least an equally strong interest in
adjudicating allegations of attorney negligence. Accordingly, simply
316
To
reciting a federal interest in patent law uniformity is not enough.”
buttress this conclusion, she quotes from the dissent in a Texas Supreme
Court case, Minton v. Gunn317: “under the Federal Circuit’s approach,
the federalism element is simply an invocation of the need for
318
The majority of the Texas Supreme Court,
uniformity in patent law.”
however, applied the four prongs of the “Grable test,” paying particular
attention to “substantiality” and “federalism,” and found federal
jurisdiction in the patent malpractice case. The Minton case will be
discussed below.
Judge O’Malley concludes her dissent with a rather cryptic
sentence: “Today, we have missed an important opportunity to correct
our case law and to acknowledge that our reading of Christianson, even
if once arguably justified, can no longer be so.”319 According to her
analysis of Christianson in view of Grable, it is not apparent how Air
Measurement (AMT) and Immunocept and their progeny could be “once
arguably justified.” Nonetheless, it does appear that her reading of
Christianson and Grable would divest federal courts from jurisdiction in
substantially, if not all, patent attorney malpractice cases and sweep
them back into state courts.

315. Byrne, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6021 at *27 n.5. In USPPS, the Fifth Circuit transferred
the appeal to the Federal Circuit. 647 F.3d at 275-76. In a per curium decision, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Avery Dennison.
USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., No. 2011-1525, 2012 WL 1292886, at *1. Judge Prost
concurred indicating that “Our jurisdiction over this case is not disputed . . . .“ Id. at *7. Stating
that their concurrence was based on Federal Circuit precedent and indicating that the precedent
should be revisited, Judge O’Malley concurred in the decision, and Judge Mayer joined. Id.
316. Id. at *46.
317. Minton II, 355 S.W.3d 634, 652 (Tex. 2011).
318. Byrne, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6021 at *46 (quoting Minton II, 355 S.W. at 652 (Guzman,
J., dissenting)).
319. Id. at *50-51 (emphasis added).
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The use of a “hypothetical patent claim” or “hypothetical patent”
categorization as a surrogate for jurisdictional determination as
suggested in the panel decision in Byrne appears to be abandoned in the
en banc dissent in favor of a generalized exclusion of patent attorney
malpractice cases from federal jurisdiction on the basis “substantiality”
and “federalism.” In a footnote, Judge O’Malley refers to the problem
of “hypotheticality” in the context of the case-within-a-case analysis of a
patent malpractice case:
In virtually every patent-related malpractice action that requires a
“case[-]within[-]a[-] case” analysis, there will be a hypothetical patent
issue raised—i.e., in a world where no malpractice occurred, would the
patentee have fared better, for example, in its patent application or
infringement suit? In that sense, the patent issue in any malpractice
action will involve only an academic inquiry into what likely would
have happened absent the attorney negligence, and the answer will
affect only the result of the state law claim, not the rights or scope of
320
any live patent.

Of course, all legal malpractice cases involving a case-within-a-case
analysis are inherently hypothetical, because the aggrieved client is
alleging a hypothetical better outcome that did not occur but for the
alleged malpractice of its attorney.
3. Synopsis of Federal Circuit Jurisdictional Cases
A number of conclusions may be seen as following from an
analysis of the foregoing Federal Circuit cases relating to jurisdiction in
patent attorney malpractice cases. First, the court has taken an
expansive view of its jurisdiction and the scope of what constitutes a
significant question of federal patent law as stated in Christianson.
Second, the court has not generally considered Grable as placing
any significant limitation on its jurisdiction as having a “disruptive
portent in exercising federal jurisdiction,” in that there is strong federal
interest in resolving patent issues by a specialized court. Nonetheless, as
seen in the license cases (Lab. Corp. and Clearplay), the patent issue
must be “actually disputed and substantial.” Recently in Byrne, two
judges would reconsider the jurisdictional issue. In the denial of
rehearing en banc, the number of judges voting to rehear was increased
to four, with seven not wishing to hear the case en banc.321 The Byrne
320. Id. at 24-26 n.4.
321. The outcome of an en banc rehearing of the jurisdiction issues is far from clear
considering the prior positions of the judges currently sitting on the Federal Circuit as summarized
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case may provide a good vehicle for the Supreme Court to address the
jurisdiction issue in malpractice cases involving questions of patent
322
law.
Third, to resolve the jurisdiction issue, the Federal Court employs
the case-within-a-case methodology; however, the application does not
appear to be so far in an entirely coherent manner. In certain cases it
appears to be following the judgment model, while in others the nonjudgment model. For example, in Air Measurement and Warrior Sports,
the underlying cases (infringement) had been settled prior to any
judgment being entered of infringement, and plaintiffs were claiming
damages based on “diminished settlement value,”323 yet the court
appears to require a finding of infringement to establish jurisdiction over
the malpractice cases. With these cases may be compared Touchcom,
where plaintiff is claiming loss of an infringement judgment, and the
court appropriately finds jurisdiction.
On the other hand, in Immunocept, the court finds jurisdiction in the
malpractice case without reference to infringement and no indication of
what damages would have to be proven in the malpractice case.
Jurisdiction in Davis is found on the basis that plaintiff would have to
prove in the malpractice case that a patent would have been granted, but
there is no mention of damages in the form of a judgment. Also, in
Carter, based on breach of fiduciary duty as raising a federal issue under

here: Chief Judge Michel, who wrote the opinions in AMT and Immunocept, has retired; Judge
Gaharsa has assumed senior status, had joined Judge O’Malley on the panel in Byrne urging the
revisiting of the jurisdictional issue, had written the opinion in Lab. Corp., and joined in Touchcom;
Chief Judge Rader dissented from the denial in Byrne but concurred in both AMT and Immunocept;
Judge Newman was for denial in Byrne, joined in Davis and Warrior Sports and concurred and
dissented in part in Carter; Judge Lourie was for denial in Byrne, joined in AMT and Immunocept
and wrote the opinion in Touchcom; Judge Bryson was for denial in Byrne, wrote the opinions in
Clearplay and Warrior Sports, and joined in Davis; Judge Linn was for denial in Byrne; Judge Dyk
wrote the opinion denying rehearing in Byrne, wrote an opinion in Carter, and dissented in Lab.
Corp.; Judge Prost was for denial in Byrne, and joined in Warrior Sports; Judge Moore dissented
from the denial and joined in Carter, but wrote the opinion in Davis; Judge O’Malley wrote the
dissent from the denial of rehearing in Byrne; Judge Reyna was for denial in Byrne; Judge Wallach
joined in dissenting from the denial in Byrne.
322. Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court in two cases that would have raised the
federal jurisdictional issue: Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, 131 S. Ct. 1472 (2011), and Davis
v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., 131 S. Ct. 118 (2010). A petition for writ of certiorari has been filed
in Minton II, Supplemental Brief in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Gunn v.
Minton, No. 11-1118, 2012 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1404, at *3 (Tex. Dec. 16, 2011) (citing the
Federal Circuit’s denial of rehearing and the accompanying opinions in Byrne as evidence of “just
how misguided the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction standard is” and how “the Federal Circuit is not
going to correct the problem itself.”).
323. See Warrior II, 631 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin
Gump, 504 F.3d 1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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the CFR and MPEP, there is no mention of possible damages in the
malpractice case. Thus, Immunocept, Davis, and Carter, while
employing the case-within-a-case methodology, appear to follow the
non-judgment model.
II. THE CASE-WITHIN-A-CASE METHODOLOGY IN FEDERAL AND STATE
COURTS
By and large there has been wide, if not universal, acceptance of
Air Measurement and Immunocept in both federal district and state
courts. In this section, some exemplary cases will be reviewed with an
end to ascertaining the manner in which case-within-a-case methodology
is used to determine jurisdiction and in resolving the malpractice case.
Relevant details of these and other cases relating to the methodology
used and whether the judgment or non-judgment model is adopted are
included in the Appendix.
A.

Federal Circuit Versus Regional Circuit Tension

In addition to Christianson, an example of the tension that may
arise between the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit under
§ 1338 and regional court of appeals with respect to controversies
involving intellectual property, including malpractice cases, arose in
three cases decided by the Fifth Circuit. In the first case, Scherbatskoy
324
v. Halliburton Co., decided in 1997, and not involving malpractice,
the Fifth Circuit held that it had authority to determine whether the
325
district court had jurisdiction under § 1338(a) and then concluded that
the Federal Circuit had exclusive appellate jurisdiction under § 1295
because the resolution of the underlying patent license dispute would
require a determination of whether the licensed patent was infringed.326
The second case, Singh v. Duane Morris LLP,327 decided in 2008,
was a trademark attorney malpractice case, where plaintiff filed suit in a
Texas state court, alleging that the defendant attorney had “mistakenly
failed at trial to introduce available evidence that would have
328
The defendant
successfully established secondary meaning.”
removed the case to the federal district court, which held it had

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., 125 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 291.
Id.
Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 337.
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jurisdiction and then dismissed plaintiff’s malpractice claim.329 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court on the
330
In its application of Grable, the
basis that it did not have jurisdiction.
court posits:
[F]ederal question jurisdiction exists where (1) resolving a federal
issue is necessary to resolution of the state-law claim; (2) the federal
issue is actually disputed; (3) the federal issue is substantial; and (4)
federal jurisdiction will not disturb the balance of federal and state
judicial responsibilities. Although the first and second elements are
331
probably satisfied in this case, the third and fourth are not.

The court concluded that the federal issue was not substantial
enough to warrant federal jurisdiction and that the extension of “federal
jurisdiction over this state-law malpractice claim would upend the
balance between federal and state judicial responsibilities” in violation
of the directive of Grable.332 Moreover, the court declined to extend Air
Measurement because it did not consider the federal/state balance issue
of Grable and because Air Measurement was a patent case involving
exclusive federal jurisdiction, and this case involved trademark law.333
The court, however, did qualify its holding:
It is possible that the federal interest in patent cases is sufficiently
more substantial, such that it might justify federal jurisdiction. But we
need not decide the question before the Federal Circuit, because it is
not before us. We conclude only that jurisdiction does not extend to
334
malpractice claims involving trademark suits like this one.
335

In the third case, USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., decided
in 2011, the Fifth Circuit was directly faced with the issue of federal
jurisdiction in a patent malpractice case, with the issue being finally
raised by the court in the third appeal in this case:
This suit, involving state-law claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary
duty in connection with a patent application, reaches us for a third
time. We most recently reversed the district court’s dismissal of the
case as time-barred at the pleading stage and remanded for further
factual development.

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Id.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 340.
Id.
USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 647 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2011).
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...
We requested supplemental briefing on the issue of whether exclusive
appellate jurisdiction rests in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a) and 1338(a). After
reviewing the record, we conclude that this case raises a substantial
issue of patent law such that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal, and
336
we order the appeal transferred to the Federal Circuit.

In so holding, the court followed Federal Circuit precedent (in particular
Air Measurement, Immunocept, and Davis):
Without a valid patent—and indeed, without also showing other
personalized postage stamps would have infringed on its patent
(another substantial question of patent law that likely would have to be
decided)—USPPS has no injury. USPPS’s claims therefore depend
337
upon resolving at least one issue of patent law in its favor.

The court also recognized the policy rationale of the strong federal
interest in having uniformity in patent law questions and conformity
“both to Singh’s requirement of balancing the federal and state interests
involved and Scherbatskoy’s implicit recognition of the special federal
338
In determining that the Federal Circuit had
interest in patent law.”
jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit used case-within-a-case methodology in
finding significant questions of patent law being raised in the resolution
of the malpractice case to establish any injury on the part of the
plaintiff.339 However, presumably, it will now be up to the Federal
Circuit to decide the statute of limitations question under Texas law
340
before it will be able to consider any patent law questions.
B.

Courts following Air Measurement/Immunocept
1. U.S. District Courts

Tomar Electronic, Inc. v. Watkins,341 decided in 2009 by the U.S.
District Court for the District of Arizona, provides an example of the
application of the “judgment” model to the jurisdictional issue, where
the plaintiff (Tomar) in the malpractice case could prevail against the

336. Id. at 275-76.
337. Id. at 281.
338. Id. at 282.
339. Id. at 281.
340. See id. at 284.
341. Tomar Elec. Inc., v. Watkins, No. 2:09-cv-00170-PHX-ROS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
95573 (D. Ariz. July 23, 2009).

10- ODDI_MACRO_NEW FOOTNOTES FINAL.DOCM

118

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

5/25/2012 1:16 PM

[6:71

defendant patent attorneys whether the hypothetical judgment would be
found to be of infringement or non-infringement of a competitor’s
342
In the underlying infringement case, a default judgment of
patent.
infringement was entered against Tomar as a sanction for misconduct
during the litigation, which included damages for infringement of
approximately $7.3 million and an injunction on the sale of certain of
Tomar’s products.343 Tomar filed a malpractice action against the
defendant attorneys in an Arizona state court that was removed to
344
In one count of the malpractice
federal court by defendant attorneys.
case, Tomar claimed that the default judgment would not have been
345
Thus, for
entered but for the negligence of the defendant attorneys.
plaintiff Tomar to prevail in the malpractice case, it would have to
establish that the patent was not infringed, invalid, or unenforceable,
which raised a substantial question of patent law justifying federal
346
In another count, Tomar alleged that defendant attorneys
jurisdiction.
were negligent in the preparation of a “patent infringement opinion
letter,” which evidently gave an opinion that Tomar did not infringe the
patent in the underlying litigation.347 The court reasoned that, if the
patent was not infringed, then the opinion letter was correct and the
348
However, the infringement judgment
defendants were not negligent.
was entered as a sanction not on the merits; thus, the question of the
correctness of the opinion raised a substantial question of patent law.349
The defendant attorneys are thus placed in the rather precarious
position of having to defend, in one count, that the patent was infringed,
valid, and enforceable, while, in the other count, that the opinion letter
was correct and the patent was not-infringed, invalid, and/or
unenforceable.350 This consequence illustrates one of the perils of
having the same counsel giving the patent clearance opinion and
351
representing the accused infringer in the infringement litigation.
342. See id. at *5-16.
343. Id. at *2.
344. Id. at *3.
345. Id. at *14.
346. Id. at *14-15.
347. Id. at *15.
348. Id. at *15-16.
349. Id.
350. See id. at *14-16.
351. Probably the most serious issue raised by having the same lawyer or firm providing the
opinion and also acting as trial counsel is the potential disqualification of trial counsel under the
Akron Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 3.7 Lawyer As Witness
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
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In Max-Planck-Gesellschaft Zur Foerderung der Wissenschaften
352
decided in 2009 by the U.S.
E.V. v. Wolf Greenfield & Sacks, PC,
District Court for Massachusetts, plaintiff asserted two claims against
defendant attorneys: (1) conflict of interest for joint representation of
co-owners of applications before the PTO and seeking removal from
such representation, and (2) malpractice on a variety of grounds relating
353
The court refused to
to prosecution and seeking money damages.
remand the case to the state court upon motion by the malpractice
354
plaintiff, holding that substantial questions of patent law were raised.
The court based its jurisdictional finding on the causation element of the
355
stating: “Although the Court finds that removal
malpractice claim,
was appropriate under § 1338(a) because of the legal malpractice claim,
that analysis only applies to Max-Planck’s request for money damages,
356
However,
which necessitates an analysis of the ‘causation’ element.”
the court goes on to conclude that if money damages had not been
sought, plaintiff’s seeking a judgment requiring defendant attorneys to
cease prosecuting the co-owned application and representing the coowners would be a matter of state jurisdiction “because there is no
federal preemption in the area of ethical rules for patent prosecution
357
before the USPTO.”
This case was decided prior to Carter, discussed above, where the
Federal Circuit found a determination of whether defendant attorney’s
conduct complied with the MPEP and the CFR as a “necessary element”
of the malpractice claim and hence raised a significant federal
question.358 Evidently, Max-Planck based its breach of fiduciary duty

necessary witness unless:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm
is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.
Another issue that may arise with respect to a lawyer or firm acting in dual capacities is the
potential waiver of attorney-client privilege or the work-product privilege usually in the context of
relying upon the advice of counsel to avoid a charge of willful infringement. See DAVID HRICIK &
MERCEDES MEYER, PATENT ETHICS: PROSECUTION 197-209 (2009) (discussing both issues and
relevant cases).
352. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft Zur Foerderung der Wissenschaften E.V. v. Wolf Greenfield &
Sacks, PC, 661 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D. Mass. 2009).
353. Id. at 127.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 130.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. See Carter v. Alk Holdings, Inc., 605 F.3d 1319, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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claim on Massachusetts ethical rules.359 In any event, the district court
found federal jurisdiction in the malpractice count based on errors of
prosecution, with a general allegation of money damages being
sufficient, thus indicating the application of the non-judgment model.360
In ASTech International, LLC v. Husick,361 decided by the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 2009, the
question of federal jurisdiction was not raised362 where the alleged
malpractice of the defendant attorneys was permitting two provisional
applications to be abandoned for failure to pay the filing fees and
misrepresenting the continued pendency of the applications.363
Defendants moved for summary judgment on a variety of grounds,
including the statute of limitations and the inability of plaintiffs to prove
actual damages.364 Plaintiff argued that actual damages only had to be
365
citing
proved when the case-within-a-case involved litigation,
366
Hackers, Inc. v. Palmer,
a Pennsylvania decision involving legal
malpractice.367 The court disagreed and drew a distinction between
case-within-a-case “methodology” and “terminology”: “Instead, both of
those cases have merely recognized that the ‘case-within-a-case’
terminology (as opposed to methodology) is inappropriate where the
alleged malpractice arises outside the context of litigation because, in
such cases, there is technically no ‘case’ to be proven.”368
It is not apparent from the foregoing analysis of Air Measurement
that the Federal Circuit had “merely recognized . . .the ‘case[-]within[]a[-]case’ terminology,” as it stated that case-within-a-case was a
“requirement” and required plaintiff to establish infringement for
jurisdiction as opposed to diminished settlement value, which was
claimed as actual damages.369 The district court, however, makes the
important recognition that: “Regardless of whether the method of proof
is characterized as ‘case-within-a-case,’ ‘transaction-within-a-case,’ or

359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

See Max-Planck, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 129.
See id. at 127.
ASTech Int’l, LLC v. Husick, 676 F. Supp. 2d 389 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
Id. at 389.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 401-02.
Hackers, Inc. v. Palmer, 79 Pa. D. & C.4th 485 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2006).
Id. at 485.
ASTech, 676 F. Supp. 2d at 402.
See supra text accompanying notes 81-127.
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‘patent-prosecution-within-a-case,’ Pennsylvania courts have been very
370
clear that plaintiffs in all malpractice actions must prove actual loss.”
In other words, in the malpractice case, the case-within-a-case
methodology should be used whether the damage claimed is due to the
loss of a favorable judgment or other cognizable actual damages. As
discussed above, this methodology is also appropriate for analyzing the
jurisdictional issue.371
Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc. v. Patterson, Thuente, Skaar &
Christensen, P.A.,372 decided by the U.S. District Court for Minnesota in
2009, provides an example in a litigation situation of the application of
the case-within-a-case methodology without imposing a requirement that
the malpractice plaintiff establish that it would have prevailed in the
underlying case, but only that it would have obtained a more favorable
outcome.373 The malpractice plaintiff had been found to infringe a
patent, and a judgment of $24 million was entered against it.374 Plaintiff
then brought a malpractice case in a state court against its former
attorneys in the infringement case, who removed the case to the District
Court,375 which applied Air Measurement in finding federal jurisdiction:
[T]he resolution of the legal malpractice action—which is governed by
Minnesota state law that imposes the same “but for” causation
requirement as did the law of the state at issue in Air Measurement
Technologies—will inevitably involve the determination of whether
Rockwood could have obtained a better outcome in the underlying
infringement litigation (at least by being held liable for lesser damages
376
if not by obtaining a verdict of non-infringement or of invalidity).

The court thus applied the case-within-a-case methodology to define
damage as being a more favorable outcome, rather than requiring a
judgment of non-infringement.377 Hence, the plaintiff could have been
held to be an infringer and still recover, if it could establish that its
infringement damages would have been less but for the negligence of its
attorneys.378

370. ASTech, 676 F. Supp. 2d at 402.
371. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
372. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc. v. Patterson, Thuente, Skaar & Christensen, P.A., No.
09-2493 (DWF/FLN), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119349 (D. Minn. Dec. 22, 2009).
373. Id. at *10-11.
374. Id. at *1.
375. Id. at *2.
376. Id. at *10-11.
377. Id. at *16-17.
378. Id. at *13-14.
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2. State Courts
A number of state courts seem quite willing to accept the broad
federal subject matter jurisdiction claim over patent malpractice cases as
laid out in AirMeasurement/Immunocept. A leading case among these is
the recent decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Minton v. Gunn,
decided in December 2011.379 The case is of particular interest because
of its analysis of the federal/state jurisdiction balance under Grable.
The case originated with plaintiff Minton filing a malpractice claim
in a Texas court against its former patent attorneys for failure to assert
the “experimental use” exception against an “on-sale” statutory bar in a
patent infringement suit.380 The court granted a summary judgment
against the plaintiff.381 Plaintiff in his appeal argued that the state court
382
The majority of the Texas
did not have subject matter jurisdiction.
appellate court agreed, holding:
The federal issue here is not substantial. Although significant to
plaintiffs claim, the issue of whether there was evidence of
experimental use of the technology at issue is predominantly one of
fact, with little or no precedential value. Therefore resolution of the
issue will not require ‘resort to the experience solicitude and hope of
uniformity that a federal forum offers.’ The courts of this state are
383
perfectly capable of deciding cases such as this.

The court declined to follow Air Measurement and Immunocept,
concluding that the Federal Circuit’s decisions are not binding on the
Texas court,384 and relied upon Singh, a Fifth Circuit trademark
385
Moreover, the court concluded
malpractice case, discussed above.
that the Federal Circuit had misapplied Supreme Court precedent with
regard to “arising under” jurisdiction.386

379. Minton II, 355 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2011).
380. Minton I, 301 S.W.3d 702, 706 (Tex. App. 2009), rev’d, 355 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2011).
381. Id. at 707.
382. Id. at 708.
383. Id. at 709.
384. Id. at 710.
385. See id. at 708 (citing Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 2008)).
386. Minton I, 301 S.W.3d at 709. The dissenting judge asserted that the majority elected to
rely upon Singh, a trademark malpractice case, while disregarding Air Measurement and
Immunocept, which were directly on point. Id. at 721-22. Moreover, the majority is seen as
“put[ting] the cart before the horse” by looking at the state court’s summary judgment evidence,
rather than referring to the jurisdictional issue under the well-pleaded complaint doctrine. Id. at
723.
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To resolve the jurisdictional issue, the Texas Supreme Court adopts
387
what it calls the “Grable test,” which was set out in Singh interpreting
Grable: “In other words, federal question jurisdiction exists where (1)
resolving a federal issue is necessary to resolution of the state-law claim;
(2) the federal issue is actually disputed; (3) the federal issue is
substantial; and (4) federal jurisdiction will not disturb the balance of
federal and state judicial responsibilities.”388 The court finds the first
prong of the test to be satisfied because the experimental use exception
as a matter of federal patent law must be resolved to determine whether
the patent was time-barred in order to resolve the state-law malpractice
389
The second prong was found to be satisfied, as the viability of
claim.
the experimental use exception as a matter of federal law was certainly
disputed by the parties in the context of the malpractice case.390
Whether the third prong of the Grable test—the substantiality of the
experimental use issue—is sastified is considered by the court to be a
closer question.391 However, it concludes that this issue is substantial
enough to justify federal jurisdiction, reasoning that the “experimental
use exception presented here is more similar to the substantial federal
issue presented in Grable [construction of a federal tax statute] than the
insubstantial issue presented in Empire [federal law preempting state law
on reimbursement of benefits but state law determining entitlement to
reimbursement].”392 The court considers the final Grable element—
whether the federal-state jurisdictional balance will be upset—“perhaps
393
To conclude that this element had been
the most important.”
387. Minton II, 355 S.W.3d 634, 642 (Tex. 2011).
388. Singh, 538 F.3d at 338 (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg.,
545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005)).
389. Minton II, 355 S.W.3d at 642.
390. Id. at 642-43.
391. Id. at 643.
392. Id. In the paragraph following this quotation, the court cites a number of federal and state
court decisions following Grable and supporting federal jurisdiction. Id. at 643-44. These include:
USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 647 F.3d 274, 280-82 (5th Cir. 2011); Warrior Sports, Inc. v.
Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C., 631 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Davis v. Brouse McDowell,
L.P.A., 596 F.3d 1355, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Immunocept II, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285 (Fed. Cir.
2007), reh’g denied, 2006-1432, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26823 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2007); U.S.
Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Additive Controls & Measurement Sys.,
Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 477-78 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius, LLP, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). It is interesting to note,
however, that the parenthetical following the Davis citation “(holding that a state-based legal
malpractice action presented a substantial federal patent issue where no patent had actually issued
because of the attorney's alleged failure to timely file the patent application)” inaccurately reports
the jurisdictional base in Davis as did the Federal Circuit in Byrne (discussed supra text
accompanying notes 285-89.
393. Minton II, 355 S.W.3d at 644.
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satisfied, the court relies heavily upon the public policy underlying
federal court jurisdiction over patents issued by a federal agency,
including the public interest in having expert and uniform application of
patent law.394
While the court makes clear that it is not bound by decisions of the
Federal Circuit,395 it concludes: “We agree with the Federal Circuit that
when the validity of a patent is questioned, even if within the context of
a state-based legal malpractice claim, the federal government and patent
litigants have an interest in the uniform application of patent law by
courts well-versed in that subject matter.”396 Nonetheless, it would
appear that this agreement should be considered within the context of the
satisfaction of the elements of the Grable test, which would appear to
offer some scope of state jurisdiction with respect to insubstantial issues
397
of patent law.
TattleTale Portable Alarm Systems, Inc. v. Calfee, Halter &
Griswold, LLP,398 decided by the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth
Appellate District, in 2009, affirmed for lack of subject matter
394. Id. at 644-45.
395. Id. at 640.
396. Id. at 646.
397. As stated by the court:
In the future, just as Minton has done, any state litigant asserting a legal malpractice
action to recover for damages resulting from his patent attorney’s negligence in patent
prosecution or litigation must also satisfy all four elements of the Grable test to place his
claim under exclusive federal jurisdiction. In the context of state-based legal malpractice
claims, plaintiffs will not always be able to meet such a burden. See, e.g., Holmes Grp.,
Inc., 535 U.S. at 831 (holding a patent-law counterclaim cannot serve as the basis for
“arising under” jurisdiction); Thompson v. Microsoft Corp., 471 F.3d 1288, 1291-92
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding the state-law claim of unjust enrichment did not arise under §
1338 jurisdiction because the plaintiff could prevail on the claim by showing the
defendant's unauthorized use of proprietary information without proving inventorship
under U.S. patent laws); Roof Tech. Servs. v. Hill, 679 F. Supp. 2d 749, 754 (N.D. Tex.
2010) (explaining that a state legal malpractice action involving an attorney’s “failure to
meet deadlines and communicate with [his] client” and in which “[p]atent issues are
merely floating on the periphery,” did not trigger exclusive federal patent jurisdiction);
Genelink Biosciences, Inc. v. Colby, 722 F. Supp. 2d 592, 601 (D.N.J. 2010) (holding
that where a state malpractice claim was based on missed deadlines, and not on the
validity of the actual patent itself, there was no patent issue triggering exclusive federal
patent law jurisdiction); E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. Moses & Singer, LLP, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d
516, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (finding no federal-question jurisdiction where the
ultimate question in the legal malpractice claim was not the attorney’s negligence in the
prosecution of the patent, but rather “that the defendant attorneys knew or should have
known that [the plaintiff] did not have sufficient evidence to support the claims” they
asserted on its behalf in the underlying litigation.).
Minton II, 355 S.W.3d at 646-47.
398. TattleTale Portable Alarm Sys., Inc. v. Calfee, No. 08AP-693, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS
1217 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2009).
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jurisdiction the dismissal by the state trial court of plaintiff’s malpractice
claim against the defendant patent firm for failure to pay maintenance
fees on one of plaintiff’s patents, resulting in the lapse of the patent and
the termination of a licensing agreement by a third party.399 Plaintiff
contended that its malpractice claim only “tangentially” related to
patents and did “not involve patent infringement, comparison of patent
applications, or scope of a particular patent,” as required by Immonocept
400
The court, however, refused to so
for federal jurisdiction to arise.
limit Immunocept: “While Immunocept noted that claims for patent
infringement, comparison of patent applications, and patent scope
involve a substantial question of federal patent law and confer Section
1338 jurisdiction, it did not hold, despite appellant’s assertion to the
contrary, that these are the only claims that confer such jurisdiction.”401
The defendant firm argued that “each of the key elements of
appellant’s professional negligence claim, i.e., duty, breach of duty,
causation, and damages, turn on interpretation of federal patent law.”402
The court agreed that “whether or not the patent had lapsed, and whether
or not revival/reinstatement should have been sought, require the
construction and interpretation of federal patent law.”403 This would
require a resolution in the malpractice action of the duty-breach
(negligence) element. Moreover, the court included the damage
element: “Also, damages in the case sub judice cannot be determined
404
Causation would follow in
without a determination of patent scope.”
that: But for any negligence in the lapse of the patent and its revival, no
damages would have been sustained by plaintiff. Damages in the form
of lost royalties under the license would imply the application of the
405
Plaintiff has re-filed the malpractice claim in
non-judgment model.
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, where it is
406
currently pending.
Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP,407
decided in 2010 by the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate

399. Id. at *3-4.
400. Id. at *8-9.
401. Id. at *11.
402. Id. at *9.
403. Id. at *12.
404. Id.
405. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
406. See TattleTale Portable Alarm Sys., Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, 276 F.R.D.
573 (S.D. Ohio 2011).
407. Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).

10- ODDI_MACRO_NEW FOOTNOTES FINAL.DOCM

126

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

5/25/2012 1:16 PM

[6:71

District, applied Air Measurement and Immunocept retroactively.408
Defendant patent attorneys were retained by Landmark to secure patent
rights relating to an electronic billboard, with an application being filed
in January 2002.409 During the course of the prosecution of the basic
application, the PTO restricted the application to certain claims and
410
defendants filed a divisional application for the other claims.
However, as asserted by plaintiff, the divisional application was
improperly filed, resulting in plaintiff’s being unable to receive
411
Plaintiff alleged that defendants
protection on all of its inventions.
concealed from it the problems with the divisional application until
412
Then, plaintiff filed a malpractice action in the
November 2, 2005.
Santa Clara Superior Court against defendants on November 30, 2005,
and in its first amended complaint, alleging “legal malpractice,
negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty,” inter alia, resulting in the loss
413
In its answer, one of the
of “valuable and pioneering patent rights.”
defendant patent firms raised the defense of lack of state subject matter
414
More than two years later, defendants filed a demurrer,
jurisdiction.
arguing that plaintiff’s malpractice claim raised substantial questions of
patent law and hence fell within the exclusive federal jurisdiction under
415
The Superior Court granted the demurrer.416 Plaintiff
§ 1338.
immediately filed a malpractice action in federal district court, which
added two further counts of breach of contract and fraud.417 The federal
court, however, dismissed the complaint as being time barred under the
California statute of limitations except with respect to the fraud count,
granting plaintiff leave to amend to plead equitable estoppel against the
418
Subsequently, the district court refused
statute of limitations defense.
to dismiss the fraud claim on the basis of fraudulent concealment.419
The California Court of Appeals sustained the demurrer of the
Superior Court, finding that there was a substantial question of patent
420
law, applying the reasoning of Air Measurement and Immunocept and
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.

Id. at 378-81.
Id. at 375.
Id.
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 376-77.
Id. at 377.
Id.
Id. at 383.
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concluding that: “To recover from respondents, Landmark would have
to prove that but for their failure to disclose (or intentional concealment
of) [defendant attorneys’] negligence in filing the ’916 divisional
application, it would not have lost ‘valuable and pioneering patent
421
rights.’”
The court was not swayed by the “injustice” argument made by
plaintiff:
Landmark protests that affirmance of the judgment here would
leave it without a remedy. We cannot provide relief from that
predicament. As the district court noted in rejecting Landmark’s claim
of legal disability, at the time Landmark filed this action there was
sufficient authority suggesting that federal court would be the proper
forum for resolution of the issues raised. (See, e.g., Holiday Matinee,
422
Inc. v. Rambus, Inc.
. . . [substantial patent law issues raised in
allegations of unfair royalty charges, threatened patent infringement
litigation, and baseless lawsuits].) Pennie & Edmonds alerted
Landmark to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in its answer, only
two months after the first amended complaint was filed. Like the
district court, we are not convinced that Landmark was deprived of its
423
ability to file a timely action in federal court.

Holiday Matinee, decided by this court in 2004, was not a malpractice
case, but a consumer class action case based on California statutes.424
Air Measurement and Immunocept were not decided until 2007, and
none of the defendant law firms moved to remove the state malpractice
case to federal court while the statute of limitations was running.425
After Landmark’s petition for review by the California Supreme
Court was denied,426 Landmark petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the
U.S. Supreme Court, which was also denied.427 Certiorari was also
428
If any inference can be drawn from
denied in Davis, discussed above.
the denial of certiorari, it may be that the Court is not prepared, at least
at this time, to get into the fray of federal/state jurisdictional issues as far
as patent malpractice cases may lead. This situation may change as

421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
2010).
427.
428.

Id. at 381.
Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 766, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
Landmark, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 384.
Holiday, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 767.
Landmark, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 384.
Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, No. S182516, 2010 Cal. LEXIS 6858 (Cal. July 14,
Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, 131 S. Ct. 1472 (2011).
Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., 131 S. Ct. 118 (2010).
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conflicting decisions mount within both federal and state courts, as seen
in the cases discussed herein and included in the Appendix.
B.

Courts not following or distinguishing
Air Measurement/ Immunocept
1. U.S. District Courts

A number of federal district courts have not been eager to embrace
the broad scope of Air Measurement/Immunocept. A few representative
cases are discussed here. Others may be found detailed in the Appendix.
Taylor v. Kochanowski,429 decided by the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan in March 2008, granted plaintiff’s
motion to remand to the state court, finding that the complaint did not
require the resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law.430
Defendant attorneys had represented plaintiff in an infringement action
431
The
against Daimler Chrysler and a supplier in the Eastern District.
court held the patent not infringed, which was affirmed by the Federal
Circuit.432 Plaintiff then filed a malpractice case against its former
433
Defendants removed this case to
attorneys in a Michigan state court.
434
the Eastern District.
Plaintiff’s allegations of malpractice were:
“dismissing a party from the case, inadequately representing him in the
claim against Daimler Chrysler, failing to advise him of his right to
reinstate his claim against the dismissed party prior to the expiration of
the statute of limitations, and failing to advise him of the merits of his
common law claims against the dismissed party.”435 The court appears
to agree that the case-within-a-case methodology should determine
jurisdiction, stating: “Defendants correctly argue that in order to prevail
in his legal malpractice claim, Plaintiff will have to prove that but for
436
Defendants’ negligence, he would have prevailed in his patent suit.”
Nonetheless, the court then concludes:
However, in order to prove Defendants’ negligence, Plaintiff will not
be forced to relitigate the patent issues. Those were resolved in the

429. Taylor v. Kochanowski, No. 07-11867, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20430 (E.D. Mich. Mar.
14, 2008).
430. Id. at *8.
431. Id. at *2.
432. Id. at *5-6.
433. Id. at *2.
434. Id.
435. Id. at *7.
436. Id. at *5.
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underlying action . . . . Therefore, there are no substantial questions of
federal patent law at issue in this action. Instead, Plaintiff will have to
prove the elements of a legal malpractice action, a state law cause of
437
action.

For plaintiff to prevail in the malpractice case, at least with respect to the
count against the defendants’ inadequate representation against Daimler
Chrysler, it would seem necessary that plaintiff prove that but for this
inadequate representation, infringement would have been found in the
438
The court forecloses this possibility, and it is not
underlying case.
apparent how the state court would deal with the issue of hypothetical
439
infringement but for the malpractice of defendants.
440
In Roof Technical Services v. Hill, decided in January 2010, the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas extended Grable
and rejected Air Measurement in denying federal jurisdiction in a patent
malpractice action where plaintiff alleged it failed to obtain patent
protection on its roofing system due to the negligence of the defendant
attorney.441 Plaintiff filed the malpractice claim in the district court, and
the court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.442 The court
reasoned:
All legal malpractice plaintiffs proceeding on a negligence theory must
show that, absent their attorney’s negligence, they would have won the
underlying litigation, consummated the deal, or acquired the patent.
Thus, every legal malpractice action in which the attorney commits the
alleged malpractice while handling a federal matter will raise a federal
issue. Extending federal jurisdiction to all such actions would
therefore sweep an entire category of cases, traditionally the domain of
state courts, into federal court.
After Grable, that result is
443
untenable.

In essence, while the court recognized the case-within-a-case
methodology for resolving the malpractice claim, it was unwilling to
extend that methodology to the jurisdictional question. It would appear
that failing to obtain a patent is considerably more restrictive than any

437. Id. at *5-6.
438. Id. at *5.
439. It is interesting to note that the Taylor case is not cited in the two district court opinions in
the Warrior Sports cases, and in Federal Circuit’s opinion reversing the district court. See
discussion of these cases supra text accompanying notes 257-68.
440. Roof Tech. Servs. v. Hill, 679 F. Supp. 2d 749 (N.D. Tex. 2010).
441. Id. at 752-53.
442. Id. at 754-55.
443. Id. at 754.
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“federal matter” and would seemingly be inconsistent with USPPS, Ltd.
v. Avery Dennison Corp., recently decided by the Fifth Circuit and
444
discussed above.
On the other hand, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas, in Haase v. Abraham, Watkins, Nichols, Sorrels, Agosto &
445
decided in February 2010, appeared willing to accept
Friend, LLP,
the jurisdictional sweep of Air Measurement/Immunocept.446 However,
on the basis of the damage claimed by plaintiff, the court concluded that
447
this case was distinguishable as no federal question was raised.
Plaintiff claimed that a sanction judgment was entered against him in an
infringement case where he was represented by the defendant attorney,
who allegedly negligently mislabeled tests performed on the accused
infringing device as being privileged from discovery.448 The court
449
remanded the case to state court, concluding:
The issue here will be whether the tests were discoverable—which will
likely turn on why the tests were done, what product was tested, and
who saw the tests—not whether the tests demonstrate infringement or
noninfringement. Unlike Air Measurement Techs. and Immunocept,
Haase will not have to prove a patent issue to prevail on this claim.
Accordingly, this claim does not arise under section 1338 and cannot
450
be the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction.

2. State Courts
As might be expected, certain state courts have been less than eager
to have their traditional jurisdiction over common law legal malpractice
cases usurped, even if limited to the esoteric field of patent law. A
strong challenge came from the Supreme Court of Nebraska in a patent
malpractice case arising before Air Measurement/Immunocept but
ultimately decided after the Federal Circuit had spoken.451
In New Tek Manufacturing v. Beehner (New Tek I),452 the Nebraska
Supreme Court decided in 2005 that it had jurisdiction over a

444.
445.
2010).
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.

See supra text accompanying notes 335-40.
Haase v. Abraham, No. 6:09CV547, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11132 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 9,
See id. at *6-7.
Id. at *10-11.
Id.
Id. at *19.
Id. at *11.
See New Tek Mfg., Inc. v. Beehner (New Tek I), 702 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 2005).
Id. at 336.
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malpractice action453 where the defendant attorney was accused of
negligently allowing plaintiff’s patent to expire and hence losing the
benefit of a broadened claim in a reissue patent, which would have been
otherwise infringed by a third party.454 With respect to the patent in
question and the issue of its hypothetical infringement, the state trial
court, inter alia, had held a Markman hearing, construed the claims,
including determining whether mean plus function claims, and applied
455
The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded
the doctrine of equivalents.
on the jurisdictional issue:
We conclude that contrary to the defendant’s suggestion, this case is
not one “arising under” the patent law within the meaning of
§ 1338(a). The sole cause of action presented in this case is
professional negligence. Patent law is implicated only incidentally, in
that the measure of New Tek’s alleged damages requires consideration
of the hypothetical infringement of the [reissue] patent. But the
precise question is not whether Orthman Manufacturing infringed on
the [reissue] patent; rather, the question is whether, absent [defendant
attorney’s] negligence, New Tek would have been successful in an
infringement action against Orthman. . . . The construction and alleged
infringement of the [reissue] patent is relevant only insofar as it helps
us to determine who would have prevailed in that hypothetical action.
Simply stated, it is difficult to see how this case arises under federal
patent law when on the record before us, the only patent that has been
construed, and of which infringement is alleged, has expired. The
federal government has no interest in hypothetical determinations
456
regarding an unenforceable patent.

The court remanded the case to the lower court to reconsider the issue of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.457
458
Magnetek, Inc. v. Kirkland & Ellis,
decided by the Appellate
Court of Illinois, First District, in 2011, presents a malpractice case
against a patent firm, which denies federal jurisdiction on the basis of
collateral estoppel.459 The controversy began in 1998 when the
underlying infringement case was brought in the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois by the patent owner Nilssen against the
plaintiff Magnetek, who was represented in the infringement case by
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.

Id. at 346.
Id. at 343-44.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 355.
Magnetek, Inc. v. Kirkland & Ellis, 924 N.E.2d 803 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
See id. at 818-19.
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defendant Kirkland.460 The parties agreed to arbitrate the claim and, as
part of the settlement agreement, Nilssen agreed not to pursue willful
infringement and Magnetek agreed not to assert inequitable conduct as a
defense.461 The arbitration resulted in an award of over $23 million for
462
It was not until 2008
Nilssen, which was settled for $18.75 million.
that Nilssen petitioned for the certification of the arbitration award in
federal district court.463 Magnetek, with new counsel, then moved to
have the arbitration award vacated on the grounds that it had, in the
meantime, discovered facts that would have rendered the patent in
question unenforceable based upon the inequitable conduct of
464
In fact, in an infringement case originally filed in 2001, the
Nilssen.
patent in question (‘409), among others, had been held unenforceable in
Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc. (Osram I),465 decided by the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois in 2006, because of inequitable
conduct, which was affirmed by the Federal Circuit the following
year.466 Kirkland had represented Osram in the infringement case and
does not deny that it asserted the inequitable conduct defense on
467
Osram’s behalf.
Nonetheless, the district court refused to vacate the arbitration
award because Magnetek could not produce clear and convincing
evidence of the fraud before the Patent Office, and that such evidence
was not discoverable prior to the arbitration.468 After this decision,
Magnetek filed a malpractice claim against defendant Kirkland in the
469
The defendant moved to have the
Circuit Court for Cook County.
case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which was granted
470
The Illinois Appellate
by the state court, and Magnetek appealed.
Court concluded that the inequitable conduct holding against the patent
owner Nilssen was governed by the doctrine of collateral estoppel,471
stating:

460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.

Id. at 806.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc. (Osram I), 440 F. Supp. 2d 884 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
See Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc. (Osram II), 504 F.3d 1223, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Magnetek, 924 N.E.2d at 817.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 808.
Id. at 806.
Id. at 818-19.
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The doctrine of collateral estoppel dictates that the final determination
of the unenforceability of the ‘409 patent applies in the underlying
lawsuit. The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have long
recognized that when a patent has been held to be unenforceable in a
suit involving one alleged infringer, an unrelated party may rely on
that unenforceability decision under the principles of collateral
472
estoppel.

Then the court relied upon the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of Grable
in Lab. Corp. as requiring a “disputed” question of federal patent law:
Consequently, as the Federal Circuit discussed in [Lab. Corp.], the
issue of the unenforceability of the ‘409 patent, based on the defenses
asserted by Osram and now claimed by Magnetek, “has been resolved
and is no longer disputed.” [citing LabCorp] While a finding of legal
malpractice would depend on the unenforceability of the ‘409 patent,
the circuit court would not have to conduct an independent analysis of
unenforceability because the district court established, and the Federal
Circuit affirmed, the merits of that claim and neither party contests
those decisions. . . . Therefore, there is no “disputed” federal patent
issue raised by Magnetek’s legal malpractice complaint that would
473
give rise to federal jurisdiction.

The presumably “substantial” but not “disputed” question of patent law
of inequitable conduct having been once and for all determined thus
eliminated any further basis for federal jurisdiction.474 The malpractice
case would have to proceed in state court under that determination to
resolve whether the plaintiff Magnetek could establish all elements of its
malpractice case accordingly.475 The court did not consider that
Kirkland was prejudiced by the fact that the Osram case was decided
after the arbitration because the law of inequitable conduct was the same
at both times.476
Other courts that have either refused to follow or have
distinguished Air Measurement and Immunnocept are detailed in the
Appendix.

472.
473.
474.
475.
476.

Id. at 818 (citations omitted).
Id. at 819 (citing Lab. Corp. IV, 599 F.3d 1277, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted)).
Magnetek, 924 N.E.2d at 810.
Id. at 819.
Id. at 820.
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Summary

Most courts, federal and state, appear to accept the jurisdictional
scope of Air Measurement and Immunocept and apply the case-within-acase methodology in resolving the jurisdictional question of whether a
significant question of patent law is raised within the elements of the
malpractice case. It also appears that malpractice plaintiffs prefer state
jurisdiction, while defendant patent attorney prefer federal jurisdiction.
Conventional wisdom might suggest that plaintiffs perceive that state
courts provide a local advantage and judges familiar with handling
malpractice cases, while defendant attorneys may perceive it to be
advantageous to be in the more familiar federal court system and also to
rely upon the expertise in patent matters of the federal courts,
particularly appeals to the Federal Circuit. Presumably, the federal
district courts that seem to reject or severely limit Air
Measurement/Immunocept will be brought into line as seen in Warrior
Sports and what may be expected in the Fifth Circuit under USPPS.
Also, it may be expected that decisions like that of the Nebraska
Supreme Court in the New Tek cases may be blunted by defendant patent
attorneys using the removal process to federal district courts, presuming
these courts will be receptive to removal.
III. OTHER JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES BEYOND CASE-WITHIN-A-CASE
There are a number of issues relating to jurisdiction in patent
attorney malpractice cases that are beyond the scope of this article and
will have to wait for further developments. These include: how should
a “claim” in a complaint as the basis for federal jurisdiction be defined
as contrasted to a “theory” underlying the claim;477 when, if ever, should
a defense raising a substantial question of patent law justify the grant of

477. See, e.g., Eddings v. Glast, Phillips & Murray, Civil Action No. 3:07-CV-1512-L, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48589 (N.D. Tex. June 24, 2008) (if the malpractice plaintiff can recover on any
theory not involving patent law, no federal jurisdiction); Danner, Inc. v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, No.
CV 09-1220-JE, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63590 (D. Or. June 23, 2010) (remanded malpractice case
to state court distinguishing Davis as only involving one claim and at least one of the theories did
not involve patent law). Compare Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., 596 F.3d 1355, 1359-60
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (broadly defining “claims” and finding federal jurisdiction on one claim raising
substantial question of patent law and assuming supplemental jurisdiction over claim of failure to
file PCT applications) with Clearplay, Inc. v. Max Abecassis, 602 F.3d 1364 (Fed Cir. 2010)
(finding no jurisdiction because none of claims required patent law to resolve) (see text
accompanying notes 233-44). See also Revolutionary Concepts, Inc. v. Clements Walker PLLC,
2010 NCBC 4 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2010) (malpractice plaintiff permitted to voluntarily dismiss claim
involving question of patent law to retain state jurisdiction).
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federal jurisdiction;478 should federal jurisdiction be granted in
479
malpractice cases involving foreign or PCT applications or patents;
what is the impact of 28 U.S.C. § 1447 on the Federal Circuit’s
jurisdiction;480 how should the statute of limitations be applied;481

478. See, for example, E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. Moses & Singer, LLP, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 516 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2010), in which a plaintiff’s malpractice claim was that defendant patent attorneys were
negligent in advising it to file infringement suits. Defendants argued that the state court lacked
jurisdiction because its defense was that the patents were infringed. Id. at 520. The court held that
plaintiff’s claim was based on the state issue of whether defendants had breached the standard of
care and the matter of its defense involving patent law did not oust state court jurisdiction. Id. at
525-27. Compare Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump, 504 F.3d 1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir.
2007), in which the Federal Circuit stated:
In addition to proving patent infringement in the “case-within-a-case” context, AMT will
have to show that it would have prevailed against the defenses the prior litigants raised.
These are not the sort of jurisdiction-defeating defenses contemplated by Christianson,
486 U.S. at 809, for they are part of the malpractice causation element rather than the
defenses raised by Akin Gump in the current litigation.
Id. at 1270. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 81-127. It is interesting to note that
plaintiff E-Pass filed a malpractice action in federal district court after the trial court but before the
appellate court decision alleging that defendant patent attorneys had “misunderstood and
misconstrued the [ ]patent in the underlying federal actions.” E-Pass Techs. v. Moses & Singer,
LLP, No. C-09-5967 EMC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128018, at *31 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011). The
district court refused to dismiss the action on diversity grounds but also maintained subject matter
jurisdiction on the basis of the allegation, citing Air Measurement. Id. at *30-31.
479. See, e.g., Antiballistic Sec. & Prot., Inc. v. Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell &
Berkowitz, P.C., 789 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 2011) (no federal question as alleged malpractice was
not filing Canadian patent applications; U.S. patents had issued); Davis, 596 F.3d at 1357 (one
claim was for failure to file PCT applications and a second claim was for failure to properly file
U.S. applications). See also Revolutionary Concepts, 2010 NCBC 4 (“Where the issues involve
foreign patent rights and issues of whether a lawyer complied with a standard of care, federal
jurisdiction is not mandated.”).
480. See Arc Products, L.L.C. v. Kelly, 424 Fed. App’x 944, 946 (Fed. Cir. 2011), dismissing
appeal in No. 4:10-CV-1248 CEJ, 2010 WL 4363427 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 27, 2010) and Genelink
Biosciences, Inc. v. Colby, 423 Fed. App’x 977, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2011), dismissing appeal in CIVIL
NO. 09-5573(NLH)(AMD), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66177 (D.N.J. July 1, 2010). In both district
court cases, defendant attorneys had moved to remove the malpractice case to federal court and the
malpractice plaintiffs moved to remand to state court. Both district courts granted the remand on
the basis that there was no federal jurisdiction. Defendants appealed to the Federal Circuit, with the
opinions being issued on the same day by the same panel. Although indicating that the district
court’s ruling in the New Jersey case “appears contrary to this court’s precedent,” the Federal
Circuit in Arc Products held that: “We have no authority to reverse or affirm the merits of the
court’s decision beyond a determination of the court’s characterization of its remand as resting upon
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction” according to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which states: “An order
remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or
otherwise. . . . ” Arc Products, 424 Fed. App’x at 946. The same result was reached in Genelink
Biosciences, 423 Fed. App’x at 978. See Scott F. Haiber, Removing the Bias Against Removal, 53
CATH. U. L. REV. 609 (2004); Rhonda Wasserman, Rethinking Review of Remands: Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Removal Statute, 43 EMORY L.J. 83 (1994); see also Thomas C.
Goodhue, Note, Appellate Review of Remand Orders: A Substantive/Jurisdictional Conundrum, 91
IOWA L. REV. 1319 (2006).
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should the broad federal jurisdictional sweep of Air
Measurement/Immunocept be extended to malpractice involving
482
copyright, trademark or other forms of intellectual property law?
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The case-within-a-case methodology would appear to provide a
workable methodology for resolving the federal or state jurisdictional
issue in malpractice cases involving patent attorneys. In the paradigm
negligence case, a substantial question of patent law can arise with
respect to any of the elements of the case—duty, breach, causation, or
damages. The same is true with respect to malpractice cases based on
other state-based theories of malpractice, including breach of fiduciary
duty, breach of contract, or fraud. Federal jurisdiction should not be
limited to cases where malpractice plaintiffs are claiming the loss of a
favorable judgment in the underlying case (the judgment model). To
avoid this limitation, a broader definition of “underlying case” should be
recognized to expend beyond litigation to any “controversy” (the nonjudgment model), raising a significant question of patent law in any
element of the malpractice case. Reference to the judgment/nonjudgment models may avoid the complications raised in Air
Measurement of the “case-within-a-case-within-a-case,” where federal
jurisdiction according to the Federal Circuit required the malpractice
plaintiff to establish that it would have obtained a judgment of
infringement in an infringement suit that had been settled, while
claiming damages in the malpractice based upon “diminished settlement
value.”
While the case-within-a-case methodology may be workable, it
appears clear from a review of the post Air Measurement/Immunocept
cases that malpractice plaintiffs prefer state courts and defendant patent

481. The statute of limitations may provide an obstacle to recovery by malpractice plaintiffs
who file in either state or federal district courts and have their cases dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2010) (plaintiff filed in state court, which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction) (discussed supra
text accompanying notes 407-28).
482. Compare Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. Tex. 2008) (no federal
jurisdiction in malpractice case involving trademarks) (discussed supra text accompanying notes
327-34), with Harness, Dickey & Pierce, P.L.C, v. Powerhouse Marks, LLC, Case numbers 0810292&08-10484, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78561(E.D. Mich, Sept. 29, 2008) (federal jurisdiction in
trademark malpractice case). Compare James H. Anderson, Inc. v. Johnson, No. 08 CV 6202, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65001 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2009) (copyright malpractice case that follows Singh no
federal jurisdiction), with Katz v. Holland & Knight LLP, No. 1:08cv1137, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10721 (E.D. Va. Feb. 12, 2009) (federal jurisdiction in copyright malpractice case).
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attorneys prefer federal courts, thus requiring resolution of the
jurisdiction issue in many cases by the lower court (state or federal
district), leading, of course, to many appeals. Whether the jurisdictional
advantages perceived by the parties are worth the additional time and
expense cannot be determined by reading the cases; however, both
parties run the risk of having an appeals court ruling that the trial court,
and hence the appellate court, did not have subject matter jurisdiction,
and there is the potential problem of the statute of limitations. Thus,
careful consideration must be given by both sides in patent attorney
malpractice cases to subject matter jurisdiction beyond perceived (real or
imagined) jurisdictional advantages.
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